AI 中文总结
研究基于意图的交易中奖励规则变化对价值获取者的影响，通过CoW协议CIP - 74改革这一自然实验，利用求解器份额数据发现按订单规模重分配交易价值，模型解释了该现象，且未改变平均执行质量和用户平均价格。
AI 中文摘要
基于意图的去中心化交易将执行委托给具有竞争力的一类代理——求解器，其行为受协议设计的奖励规则影响。我们通过一项治理日期的自然实验来衡量这些规则的变化如何重塑价值获取者，即CoW协议CIP - 74（2025年12月8日生效），它用与协议收入挂钩的奖励上限取代了固定的求解器奖励上限，并引入了从价交易量费用。利用395天的每日求解器份额，我们发现改革按订单规模重新分配了交易价值。稳健的特征是单调的规模梯度：在四个订单价值区间中，小订单的集中度下降，大订单的集中度上升（斯皮尔曼相关系数=1.00，精确排列p = 0.042）——这种模式在剔除单个最大求解器后依然存在。总体集中度也上升了（交易量加权的赫芬达尔 - 赫希曼指数从0.176升至0.241），主要由现任顶级求解器推动。按交易数量计算，市场集中度下降（计数赫芬达尔 - 赫希曼指数 - 0.060）。一个简单的求解器经济模型使这种模式合理化：从价费用具有竞争中性，而与收入挂钩的奖励上限提高了大订单上库存丰富的求解器的边际收益——与进入受限的预测一致（Chitra等人，2024年）。一个对照交易场所（UniswapX）没有出现匹配的变化。我们未检测到平均执行质量的变化（约7个基点的界限）。利用2026年2月费用削减进行的三重差分在方向上是一致的，但效力不足。奖励设计可衡量地重新分配了意图市场中的价值获取者，而不会改变用户获得的平均价格。
英文摘要
Intent-based decentralized exchanges delegate execution to a competitive class of agents -- solvers -- whose behavior is shaped by protocol-designed reward rules. We measure how a change to those rules reshapes who captures value, using a governance-dated natural experiment: CoW Protocol CIP-74 (effective 8 December 2025), which replaced a fixed solver-reward cap with one tied to protocol revenue and introduced an ad-valorem volume fee. Using daily solver shares over 395 days, we find the reform reallocated trading value by order size. The robust signature is a monotone size gradient: concentration fell in small orders and rose in large ones across four order-value buckets (Spearman rho=1.00, exact permutation p=0.042) -- a pattern that survives dropping the single largest solver. Aggregate concentration also rose (volume-weighted HHI 0.176->0.241), substantially carried by the incumbent top solver. By trade count the market de-concentrated (count-HHI -0.060). A simple solver-economics model rationalizes the pattern: an ad-valorem fee is competitively neutral, while a revenue-linked reward cap raises the marginal payoff to inventory-rich solvers on large orders -- consistent with restricted-entry predictions (Chitra et al. 2024). A control venue (UniswapX) shows no matching break. We detect no change in average execution quality (~7 bps bound). A triple-difference exploiting a February 2026 fee cut is directionally consistent but underpowered. Reward design measurably reallocates who captures value in intent markets, without moving the average price users receive.
Comments6 pages, 3 figures. Accepted at CBT 2026 (International Workshop on Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology, co-located with ESORICS 2026)
