对人工智能聊天机器人的意识归因在认知上是否无罪？
Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent?
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中文总结 AI 辅助
探讨人们对AI聊天机器人意识归因的合理性，通过开发多维度分类法分析相关态度，表明虽部分归因无害或无罪，但许多会让归因者在认知上应受指责，为相关研究提供框架。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
人工智能（AI）聊天机器人（如ChatGPT）能以惊人的类人方式交流，这促使许多用户将包括意识在内的心理属性归因于这些系统。然而，几乎没有科学证据表明当前的AI聊天机器人有意识。本文对人们对聊天机器人的意识归因进行概念分析，开发了一个多维度分类法，涵盖从非信念立场（如假装）到不同形式信念（包括错觉）的态度。该分类法有助于避免混淆，为实证研究提供框架，还表明尽管一些归因在认知上无害，甚至一些非理性的可能无罪，但许多会使归因者在认知上应受指责。
英文摘要
Artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots (e.g., ChatGPT) can communicate in strikingly humanlike ways. This has prompted many chatbot users to attribute psychological properties, including consciousness, to these systems. However, there is little scientific evidence that current AI chatbots are conscious. How, then, should we understand people's consciousness attributions to chatbots? Are they merely metaphorical claims, or do they express genuine beliefs? If these attributions lack evidential support, are users epistemically blameworthy for making them, or might they be epistemically innocent, yielding significant benefits otherwise unattainable? This paper offers a conceptual analysis of consciousness attributions to AI chatbots and develops a multidimensional taxonomy of the attitudes they may express, ranging from non-doxastic stances (e.g., pretence) to different forms of belief, including delusions. This taxonomy helps avoid conflations by showing that linguistically identical attributions can reflect importantly different attitudes and degrees of epistemic commitment to the proposition that chatbots are conscious. The taxonomy also provides a framework for empirical studies to operationalize and measure different forms of epistemic commitment to AI consciousness. Using this taxonomy, I argue that although some consciousness attributions to chatbots are epistemically benign, and even some irrational ones may be epistemically innocent, many others render the attributor epistemically blameworthy.
发表机构
- Utrecht University（乌得勒支大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
