AI 中文总结
研究垄断者与由交易前投资决定估值的买家，卖家通过观察信号剖析买家，刻画买卖双方收益，发现在帕累托前沿上，投资增加时敲竹杠风险使卖家收益增长快于剩余，保护买家福利需抑制投资。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究了一个垄断者面对一个其估值由交易前投资决定的买家的情况。在设定价格之前，卖家观察到一个关于买家私人投资成本的信号（买家剖析）。有助于卖家获取剩余的信息也可能削弱买家创造剩余的激励。我们刻画了所有可能剖析下买卖双方的收益。在帕累托前沿上，如果投资增加，敲竹杠风险总是使卖家获得的收益比投资创造的剩余增长得更快。因此，即使投资具有社会效率，保护买家福利也需要抑制投资。
英文摘要
We study a monopolist facing a buyer whose valuation is determined by pre-trade investment. Before setting price, the seller observes a signal about the buyer's private investment cost (buyer profiling). Information that helps the seller extract surplus can also undermine the buyer's incentive to create it. We characterize the buyer-seller payoffs attainable across all possible profiling. On the Pareto frontier, if investment increases, hold-up risk always raises the payoff that the seller captures faster than the surplus that the investment creates. Protecting buyer welfare therefore requires discouraging investment, even though investment is socially efficient.
