AI 中文总结
研究动态市场中实现高效交易所需公共信息，通过机构比较统计量来支持如实报告，得出最少公共公告数量，认证依赖外部信息，还表明约束报告信息无需协调买家，标价实施需认证容量和清算规则。
AI 中文摘要
本文研究在有私人信息的买卖双方的动态市场中，实现高效交易需要多少公共信息。一个机构将市场构成的认证统计量与参与者报告所隐含的统计量进行比较。当报告类型的每一次单边变化后统计量发生变化时，支持如实报告。当所有市场构成都有可能时，最少的公共公告数量是{K,L}，其中K是卖家质量数量，L是买家类型数量。认证必须依赖于它所检查报告之外的信息。本文还表明，足以约束报告的信息不必在有限容量下协调买家。标价实施可能需要认证容量和清算规则。
英文摘要
This paper studies how much public information is needed to implement efficient trade in dynamic markets with privately informed sellers and buyers. An institution compares a certified statistic of market composition with the statistic implied by agents' reports. Truthful reporting is supported when the statistic changes after every unilateral change in reported type. When all market compositions are possible, the least number of public announcements is {K,L}, where K is the number of seller qualities and L the number of buyer types. The certificate must rely on information outside the reports it checks. The paper also shows that information sufficient to discipline reports need not coordinate buyers across limited capacity. Posted-price implementation may require certified capacities and a clearing rule.
