AI 中文总结
研究带附加支付的组合市场稳定性，基于已有模型引入附加支付并分类，推广稳定性概念到T-核，关联不同设置稳定结果，识别部分可转移效用优势，指出个性化定价下稳定性概念归结情况。
AI 中文摘要
组合市场为不可分割商品束的交易提供了通用框架。基于Bikhchandani和Ostroy（2002年）以及Bichler和Waldherr（2017年）的组合市场模型，引入明确的附加支付，允许在代理子集间进行有限的效用转移并捕捉不同形式的金融勾结。对大量看似不同的市场设置进行系统分类，表明允许买家间附加支付时高阶市场设置在市场属性上基本等效，卖家间有附加支付时也类似，同时指出二阶和三阶设置间存在根本结构分离。为分析这些环境中的稳定性，将经典的可转移效用和不可转移效用稳定性概念推广到基于分区的有限可转移性概念（T-核），关联不同设置下的稳定结果与适当稳定性概念，识别部分可转移效用产生更好（或任何）稳定结果的市场实例，并表明在个性化定价下所有稳定性概念都归结为不可转移效用稳定性。
英文摘要
Combinatorial markets provide a general framework for trading bundles of indivisible goods. Building on the combinatorial market models of Bikhchandani & Ostroy (2002) and Bichler & Waldherr (2017), we introduce explicit side payments, thereby allowing restricted transfers of utility among subsets of agents and capturing different forms of financial collusion. This extension results in a large number of seemingly distinct market settings. However, we establish a systematic classification of their expressive power. Most notably, we show that higher-order market settings (i.e., those with more personalized prices and less clearinghouse power) are essentially equivalent in terms of market properties when side payments are permitted between buyers. An analogous collapse occurs for the third- and higher-order settings when side payments are permitted between sellers. In contrast, we identify a fundamental structural separation between the second- and third-order settings. To analyze stability in these environments, we generalize the classical concepts of stability with and without transferable utility (TU and NTU) to a partition-based notion of restricted transferability (the $T$-core). We relate stable outcomes across different settings to appropriate stability notions, identify market instances in which partially transferable utility yields a better (or any) stable outcome, and show that under personalized pricing, all stability notions collapse to NTU-stability.
Comments23 pages + 30 pages appendix, 14 figures, extended abstract accepted at SAGT'26
