隐藏行动下连续时间委托代理问题的一般模型
A General Model for Continuous Time Principal-Agent Problem Under Hidden Action
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中文总结 AI 辅助
研究隐藏行动下连续时间委托代理问题，提出新充分条件直接求解代理人问题，无需单独验证，还给出可明确求解的例子。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
本文研究一般连续时间委托代理（PA）问题，其中代理人在具有连续时间和一次性支付方案的合同下，随时间私下做出努力和消费决策。特别地，我们允许连续支付过程为受控扩散，这与实证文献中的绩效支付敏感性（PPS）直接相关。在解决代理人问题时，我们提出了一个新的充分条件，无需对一阶方法得到的解进行单独验证步骤即可直接得到代理人问题的解。我们还给出了一个可明确求解的例子。
英文摘要
In this paper, we study a general continuous-time Principal-Agent (PA) problem, where the agent privately makes effort and consumption decisions over time under a contract with payment schemes both in continuous time and in lump sums. In particular, we allow the continuous payment process to be a controlled diffusion, which is directly related to the pay-to-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the empirical literature. In solving the agent's problem, we propose a new sufficient condition that directly yields a solution to the agent's problem, without requiring a separate verification step for the solution obtained from the first-order approach. We also present an example which can be solved explicitly.
