DSA 随机数漏洞：交互式分析
DSA Nonce Vulnerabilities: An Interactive Analysis
AI总结：
针对 DSA 算法对初学者难理解且传统工具中间计算不透明的问题，本文提出用于 CTF 竞赛的 DSA 签名分析与可视化平台，具备签名生成验证等功能，涵盖三种随机数漏洞，实验证明可正确重现相关流程及场景。
AI中文摘要：
数字签名对于网络安全中的身份认证和数据完整性至关重要，NIST 标准化的数字签名算法（DSA）频繁出现在 CTF 竞赛的密码学赛道中。然而，DSA 依赖数论、模运算和大整数计算，对初学者而言算法及其相关攻击难以理解。传统工具通常仅展示输入和输出，使签名、验证及密钥恢复攻击的中间计算不透明。本文提出了一个针对 CTF 竞赛的 DSA 签名分析与可视化平台。该平台具备三项主要功能：基本签名生成与验证、重现常见 CTF 攻击方法、动态可视化攻击工作流程。它涵盖三种代表性随机数漏洞：随机数重用、线性随机数泄露和基于 HNP 的格攻击。逐步显示和突出中间值使底层计算可直接检查。实验表明该平台能正确重现标准 DSA 工作流程及所有三种攻击场景。
英文摘要：
Digital signatures are fundamental to identity authentication and data integrity in cybersecurity, and the NIST-standardized Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) frequently appears in the cryptography track of CTF competitions. However, DSA relies on number theory, modular arithmetic, and large-integer computation, making both the algorithm and its associated attacks difficult for beginners to follow. Conventional tools often expose only inputs and outputs, leaving the intermediate computations of signing, verification, and key-recovery attacks opaque. This paper presents a DSA signature analysis and visualisation platform tailored to CTF competitions. The platform provides three main capabilities: basic signature generation and verification, reproduction of common CTF attack methods, and dynamic visualisation of attack workflows. It covers three representative nonce vulnerabilities: nonce reuse, linear nonce leakage, and HNP-based lattice attacks. Stepwise displays and highlighted intermediate values make the underlying computations directly inspectable. Experiments show that the platform correctly reproduces the standard DSA workflow and all three attack scenarios.
