经审计的拍卖：减少广告中的危害
Audited Auctions: Reducing Harms in Advertising
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中文总结 AI 辅助
研究广告市场中标准拍卖机制存在的问题，提出拍卖师审计和惩罚机制，该机制可筛选严重外部性，经证明能正式内化外部性，还通过实证探索了社会福利收益。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
虽然标准拍卖机制有助于如实揭示投标人的偏好，但当它们未能考虑到出价分配对非投标人造成的外部性时，可能会无意中导致无限制的危害。买卖用户注意力的广告市场就是这样的拍卖。本研究探索了一种改善福利的拍卖师审计和惩罚机制，有助于筛选出最严重的外部性。我们证明了这种机制可以正式地将外部性内部化，然后通过实证探索社会福利收益。
英文摘要
Although standard auction mechanisms help truthfully reveal preferences of bidders, they can inadvertently result in unbounded harms when they fail to account for externalities caused by bid allocations affecting non-bidders. Ad markets, that buy and sell user attention represent such auctions. This research explores a welfare improving auctioneer's audit-and-penalty mechanism that helps screen the worst externalities. We prove this mechanism can internalize externalities formally, then explore social welfare gains empirically.
