AI 中文总结
研究针对块链拜占庭排斥无冲突复制数据类型的内存耗尽攻击，发现恶意节点能利用规则使无用更新数量任意大以压倒正确节点，提出实际部署需对正确节点接受的标识符集设额外限制。
AI 中文摘要
块链是一种有向无环图，对参与节点产生的经过认证的更新之间的因果关系进行编码。与以前的方法相比，它对可复制的内容增加了限制：当且仅当满足以下条件时，新更新及其因果历史才会在本地复制：1）它揭示了一个行为任意的新节点（拜占庭节点）；2）它由一个似乎仍然正确的节点签名，并且新更新提供了至少指控本地已知行为任意的节点集的证据。这些限制旨在限制任意更新的复制，即使存在从不产生有罪证据的勾结者，以便最终只有有限数量的更新将被正确节点复制。虽然对复制行为的原始描述成功实现了这一目标，但我们表明这个有限数量可以任意大，直至用于认证消息的标识符空间的大小。这有效地使恶意节点能够用任意和无用的更新压倒正确节点。因此，实际部署需要对正确节点将接受的标识符集进行额外限制。
英文摘要
The blocklace is a directed acyclic graph encoding the causal relationship between authenticated updates produced by participating nodes. Compared to previous approaches, it adds restrictions on what can be replicated: a new update and its causal history is replicated locally if and only if either 1) it reveals a new node behaving arbitrarily (byzantine), or 2) it was signed by a node that still appears to be correct and the new updates provide evidence incriminating at least the set of nodes locally known to have behaved arbitrarily. The restrictions purport to limit the replication of arbitrary updates, even in the presence of colluders that never produce incriminating evidence, so that only a finite number will eventually be replicated by correct nodes. While the original description of the replication behaviour successfully achieve this aim, we show that this finite number can be made arbitrarily large, up to the size of the identifier space used to authenticate messages. This effectively enables malicious nodes to overwhelm correct nodes with arbitrary and useless updates. Practical deployments therefore require additional restrictions on the set of identifiers that will be accepted by correct nodes.
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