AI 中文总结
研究长期储能合同在不完全风险市场中的作用，建立两阶段随机均衡模型评估其对投资和市场结果的影响，通过英国案例研究表明市场不完全抑制投资，不同合同各有优劣，政策制定者应综合考虑合同与制度设计平衡多方因素。
AI 中文摘要
长期储能（LDES）对于脱碳电力系统的可靠性日益重要。为鼓励投资，政策制定者引入了诸如上下限方案等合同。目前这些方案仅通过外生收入或价格分布进行评估。本文建立了一个两阶段随机均衡模型来评估LDES上下限设计如何影响投资和市场结果。该模型内生地捕捉合同设计、投资容量和资本成本之间的相互作用。英国案例研究结果表明，市场不完全性严重抑制LDES投资。中央管理的零溢价合同可通过降低下行风险恢复风险中性投资水平，但这需要消费者向投资者大量预期转移，且结果对上下限及分担参数敏感。双边谈判合同基本消除预期转移并降低对这些参数的敏感性，但投资激励较弱。政策制定者应综合考虑合同和制度设计以平衡投资激励、转移和社会福利。
英文摘要
Long-duration energy storage (LDES) is increasingly regarded as essential for reliability in decarbonized power systems. To encourage investment, policymakers introduce contracts, such as cap-and-floor schemes. So far, these schemes have only been evaluated using exogenous revenue or price distributions. This paper develops a two-stage stochastic equilibrium model to evaluate how LDES cap-and-floor design affects investment and market outcomes. This model endogenously captures the interactions among contract design, investment capacity, and cost of capital. Results for a stylized Great Britain case study show that market incompleteness substantially suppresses LDES investment. Centrally administered zero-premium contracts can restore the risk-neutral investment level by reducing downside risk, but doing so requires substantial expected transfers from consumers to investors and produces outcomes that are sensitive to the cap, floor, and sharing parameters. Bilaterally negotiated contracts largely eliminate expected transfers and reduce sensitivity to those parameters, but provide weaker investment incentives. To balance investment incentives, transfers, and social welfare, policymakers should jointly consider contract and institutional design.
