AI 中文总结
研究传统可验证秘密共享技术易受量子攻击的问题，提出瓶中证明（PiB）方法，通过解耦可验证性与长期绑定，利用Pedersen承诺和不可变账本哈希，保护诚实交易免受量子对手攻击。
AI 中文摘要
传统秘密共享技术如可验证秘密共享（VSS）易受运行Shor算法的密码学相关量子计算机（CRQC）的量子攻击。我们发现VSS所需的绑定仅在处理时需要，且可在任何CRQC出现之前完成。我们提出瓶中证明（PiB），它将可验证性与长期绑定解耦：标准Pedersen承诺在量子前窗口提供零知识、可公开检查的一致性，而基于不可变公共账本的共享集的加盐索引绑定哈希将该窗口中建立的绑定保留到量子后时代。该保证明确是一种先提交、后揭示的保证：它保护当今的诚实交易免受未来量子对手的攻击。
英文摘要
Traditional secret sharing techniques such as Verifiable Secret sharing (VSS) are vulnerable to quantum attacks by a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) running Shor's algorithm. We observe that the binding a VSS needs is required only at the moment of dealing, and this binding can be made before any CRQC exists. We propose Proof in a Bottle (PiB), which decouples verifiability from long-term binding: standard Pedersen commitments provide zero-knowledge, publicly checkable consistency during a pre-quantum window, while a salted, index-bound hash of the share set, anchored to an immutable public ledger, preserves the binding established in that window into the post-quantum era. The guarantee is explicitly a commit-now, reveal-later one: it protects today's honest dealings against tomorrow's quantum adversary.
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