AI 中文总结
研究流动民主中委托循环问题，引入模型捕捉不确定性下战略行为，通过研究纳什均衡及计算实验，发现委托循环自然出现，拉近了流动民主理论与现实的距离。
AI 中文摘要
相关学术文献中对流动民主的一个常见批评是可能出现委托循环，看似导致投票权未被使用。然而，实践者认为委托循环不仅没有问题，甚至是参与者有意形成的。为使理论更贴近现实，我们引入一个模型来捕捉不确定性下的这种战略行为。我们研究纳什均衡的存在性、结构和质量，发现委托循环自然出现。为补充这些发现，我们使用最佳响应动态进行计算实验。
英文摘要
A common criticism of liquid democracy within the relevant academic literature is that delegation cycles can occur, seemingly resulting in unused voting power. Yet, practitioners argue that delegation cycles are not only unproblematic but are even formed intentionally by participants. To bring theory closer to reality, we introduce a model that captures this strategic behavior under uncertainty. We study the existence, structure and quality of Nash equilibria, revealing that delegation cycles naturally emerge. To complement these findings, we perform computational experiments using best-response dynamics.
