人口进入下的稳健福利分散化
Robust Welfare Decentralization under Population Entry
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中文总结 AI 辅助
研究具有不可分割商品的现有经济体容纳新参与者并保持有效分配的条件，通过规范进入者测试通用进入稳健性，证明相关特征成立时价格向量可分散化现有最优解及扩展，还与稳健整性解释相关联。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
我们研究了一个具有不可分割商品的现有经济体在保留由匿名商品价格支持的有效分配的同时，何时能够容纳任意新参与者。我们将此属性称为通用进入稳健性。当且仅当经济体的总福利估值是可加的时，该经济体才具有通用进入稳健性。尽管该要求对所有进入者估值进行量化，但可以使用一个规范进入者进行测试，其对一篮子商品的价值等于移除该篮子商品所导致的现有最大福利损失。当该特征成立时，一个唯一确定的价格向量会使现有最优解和每个单主体扩展分散化。我们最终将此论点与从Bikhchandani和Mamer（1997）的线性规划特征中获得的稳健整性解释联系起来。个体现有估值可能是非可加的，并且不必满足总替代条件。
英文摘要
We ask when an incumbent economy with indivisible goods can accommodate an arbitrary new participant while retaining an efficient allocation supported by anonymous item prices. We call this property universal entry robustness. An economy is universally entry-robust if and only if its aggregate welfare valuation is additive. Although the requirement quantifies over all entrant valuations, it can be tested using one canonical entrant whose value for a bundle equals the loss in maximal incumbent welfare caused by removing that bundle. When the characterization holds, one uniquely determined price vector decentralizes the incumbent optimum and every one-agent extension. The proof is direct and uses only demand optimality and welfare comparisons, making transparent why arbitrary-entry robustness eliminates all bundle interactions in aggregate welfare. We finally relate this argument to the robust-integrality interpretation obtained from the linear-programming characterization of Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997). Individual incumbent valuations may be nonadditive and need not satisfy gross substitutes.
