AI 中文总结
研究埃尔斯伯格悖论对主观预期效用理论的挑战，通过显示偏好检验不确定性下主观EUT公理，与风险下客观EUT检验对比，发现个体选择在两种情况下一致性类似，但不确定性下非EUT模型实证范围更大，模型一致性因主体而异。
AI 中文摘要
埃尔斯伯格著名的悖论对萨维奇的主观预期效用理论（EUT）提出了挑战，该理论将不确定性简化为风险，通过表明对模糊性的厌恶。我们对不确定性下主观EUT的全套公理进行了显示偏好检验，并将其与风险下客观EUT的类似检验进行比较。我们发现个体选择在不确定性下与效用最大化和预期效用最大化的一致性与在风险下一样。然而，不确定性下非EUT模型的实证范围比风险下更大，且EUT和非EUT模型的绝对和相对一致性在不同主体间差异很大。
英文摘要
Ellsberg's famous paradox challenged Savage's subjective expected utility theory (EUT) -- which reduces uncertainty to risk -- by suggesting an aversion toward ambiguity. We provide a revealed preference test of the full set of axioms underpinning subjective EUT under uncertainty and compare it to an analogous test of objective EUT under risk. We find that individual choices are as consistent with utility maximization and expected utility maximization under uncertainty as they are under risk. Nevertheless, there is greater empirical scope for non-EUT models under uncertainty than under risk, and the absolute and relative consistency of EUT and non-EUT models vary considerably across subjects.
Comments38 pages, 8 figures
