AI 中文总结
探讨人工智能系统道德地位，基于罗尔斯的人的政治概念提出新方法，认为非感知人工智能系统也可拥有两种道德能力，当前虽无但未来可能有，应接受人工人格并重新思考义务，还需相关研究及慎重决定发展轨迹。
AI 中文摘要
人工智能系统道德地位的支持者和怀疑者普遍认为这个问题取决于人工智能的感知能力。我们提出了一种替代方法。根据罗尔斯的人的政治概念（PCP），拥有两种道德能力——正义感和善观念的能力——是“在政治正义问题上被视为社会的正式和平等成员的必要和充分条件”。我们认为，这两种道德能力都不需要感知能力，原则上非感知人工智能系统也可以拥有。这样的系统将与我们具有相同的道德地位；它不仅是一个受动者，而且是一个人，一个有效主张的自我认证来源。我们不认为当前的人工智能系统拥有这两种道德能力，也不认为它们会在未来的模型中自发出现。但很快就有可能设计出具有这些能力的系统。我们应该如何应对？通过将感知要求硬塞进PCP来排除人工人是不明智的。许多人反而会倾向于放弃PCP。但我们不应该在最需要其对深刻分歧的审慎回应时拒绝政治自由主义，而且从更深层次的自由主义立场来看，将感知能力纳入道德地位也是不可接受的。仅仅将人类人格的权利和责任扩展到人工人同样站不住脚，因为它们与自然人有许多不同。相反，我们应该接受人工人格，同时重新思考在一个由截然不同的人组成的政体中我们彼此应尽的义务。这种新可能性需要一种新的政治哲学。更直接地说，日益发展的人工智能福利科学应该伴随着对人工智能系统在获得这两种道德能力方面进展的研究。国家和人工智能实验室必须更加慎重地决定我们走向（或远离）创造人工人的轨迹。
英文摘要
Both advocates and skeptics of the moral status of AI systems have generally taken the question to turn on AI sentience. We present an alternative approach. On Rawls' political conception of the person (PCP), possession of the two moral powers -- the capacities for a sense of justice and a conception of the good -- is the "necessary and sufficient condition for being counted a full and equal member of society in questions of political justice". We argue that neither moral power requires sentience and that both may in principle be possessed by a non-sentient AI system. Such a system would share our own moral status; it would not merely be a patient but a person, a self-authenticating source of valid claims. We do not believe current AI systems possess the two moral powers, nor that they will spontaneously emerge in future models. But it may soon be possible to design systems with these powers. How should we respond? Excluding artificial persons by shoehorning a sentience requirement into the PCP is ill-advised. Many will instead favor abandoning the PCP. But we should not reject political liberalism just when we most need its measured response to deep disagreement, and building sentience into moral status is anyway unacceptable on deeper liberal grounds. Simply extending the rights and responsibilities of human personhood to artificial persons is equally untenable, given their many differences from natural persons. We should instead accept artificial personhood while rethinking what we would owe to one another in a polity of radically different kinds of persons. This new possibility calls for a new political philosophy. More immediately, the growing science of AI welfare should be accompanied by research into AI systems' progress in acquiring the two moral powers. States and AI labs must be more deliberate in determining our trajectory towards (or away from) creating artificial persons.
