Prismata:限制Web代理中的跨站提示注入
Prismata: Confining Cross-Site Prompt Injection in Web Agents
AI总结:
研究针对Web代理跨站提示注入问题,提出Prismata防御机制,通过动态信任推导生成权限标签,结合机械限制执行标签,无需开发者注释,能有效降低攻击成功率并保留良性任务效用。
摘要:
自主Web代理有望实现日常浏览任务自动化,但继承了网络最古老的攻击面之一。跨站脚本攻击证明,即使在良性页面上,混合信任和不信任内容也很危险。代理通过将自然语言解释为指令,使第三方和用户生成的内容能通过提示注入劫持代理,重新引发此风险。核心挑战在于推导特定任务的安全策略需要对与攻击者内容纠缠的页面结构进行推理。我们提出了Prismata,一种为Web代理实施上下文最小权限的防御机制,限制代理所见和所能做的事情。Prismata的动态信任推导为页面内容生成权限标签,受经典完整性模型启发,具有结构限制保证,可限制任何标签错误,使标签权限只能降低且错误标签有界。Prismata的机械限制通过编辑内容和限制代理功能来执行这些标签。重要的是,这些机制无需开发者注释,因此Prismata支持长尾网站。在最近发布的Web代理攻击中,包括自适应变体,Prismata在保留良性任务效用的同时大幅降低了攻击成功率。
英文摘要:
Autonomous web agents promise to automate everyday browsing tasks, but inherit one of the web's oldest attack surfaces. Cross-Site Scripting proved that mixing trusted and untrusted content is dangerous, even on benign pages. Agents resurface this risk by interpreting natural language as instructions, allowing third-party and user-generated content to hijack the agent via prompt injection. The core challenge is that deriving a task-specific security policy requires reasoning over page structure that is entangled with the attacker's content. We present Prismata, a defense enforcing contextual least privilege for web agents, constraining both what the agent sees and what it can do. Prismata's dynamic trust derivation produces permission labels for page content, with structural confinement guarantees, inspired by classical integrity models, that bound any labeling errors so that labels can only decrease in privilege and mislabelings are bounded. Prismata's mechanical confinement enforces these labels by redacting content and restricting agent capabilities. Importantly, these mechanisms require no developer annotations, so Prismata supports the long tail of websites. Across recent published web agent attacks, including adaptive variants, Prismata substantially reduces attack success while preserving benign task utility.
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