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arXiv 2607.07280econ.TH
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具有网络竞争和溢出效应的评估与分配

Evaluation and Assignment with Networked Competition and Spillovers

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid(马德里卡洛斯三世大学);Southwestern University of Finance and Economics(西南财经大学)

Antonio Cabrales, Wenhao Cheng

AI总结:

研究绩效取决于努力和非自主优势时组织如何设计评估规则与分配员工,通过竞争网络和溢出效应分析,得出不同情况下规划者的选择及成对稳定约束会造成产出损失的结论。

摘要:

本文研究了在绩效取决于努力和非自主优势时,组织应如何联合设计评估规则并分配员工。代理人在由竞争网络连接的职位上选择努力程度,而其有效优势取决于自身类型和通过第二个网络的溢出效应。规划者同时选择分配方式和评估中的努力权重。均衡努力程度随职位的卡茨 - 博纳西奇中心性上升而下降,随有效优势下降。最优评估规则通常不同于真实产出。当努力在生产中更重要时,规划者降低努力权重并采用负向分类分配以强化激励;当优势更重要时,则提高努力权重并采用正向分类分配以利用溢出效应。我们还研究了一个要求分配成对稳定的约束条件,它会根据竞争强度造成产出损失。

英文摘要:

This paper studies how organizations should jointly design evaluation rules and assign workers when performance depends on both effort and non-discretionary advantage. Agents choose effort in positions linked by a competition network, while their effective advantage depends on own type and spillovers through a second network. The planner chooses both the assignment and the effort weight in evaluation. Equilibrium effort rises with a position's Katz-Bonacich centrality and falls with effective advantage. The optimal evaluation rule generally differs from true output. When effort is more important in production, the planner lowers the effort weight and uses negative assortative assignment to strengthen incentives. When advantage is more important, the planner raises the effort weight and uses positive assortative assignment to exploit spillovers. We also study a constraint requiring assignments to be pairwise stable, which creates an output loss depending on the intensity of competition.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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