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arXiv 2607.03423cs.CRcs.AI
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通过动态实时组合策略保护多工具人工智能代理链

Securing Multi-Tool AI Agent Chains With Dynamic, Real-Time Compositional Policies

Microsoft AI(微软人工智能)

Chris Schneider, Kriti Faujdar, Philipp Schoenegger, Ben Bariach

AI总结:

研究多工具代理链安全问题,提出动态安全控制合成器(DSCC),分两阶段实现组合安全。阶段1在会话检查时合成策略,阶段2在运行时跟踪数据敏感度,提供深度防御,评估了参考实现。

摘要:

现代人工智能代理实现如前沿编码代理在运行时链接多个工具,产生安全隐患。我们提出动态安全控制合成器(DSCC),一种用于多工具代理链组合安全的两阶段方法。第一阶段在会话检查时,通过最严格集(MRS)算法合成安全策略;第二阶段在运行时,跟踪数据敏感度并撤销违规会话。提供参考实现并评估,讨论治理影响。

英文摘要:

Modern AI agent implementations such as frontier coding agents chain multiple tools at runtime that create a security surface that per-tool guardrails are unable to address, as individually permitted tools can violate organizational policies when composed. We propose the Dynamic Security Control Compositor (DSCC), a two-phase approach to compositional security for multi-tool agent chains. In Phase 1, at session checkout, a Most Restrictive Set (MRS) algorithm composes per-tool security policies into a single effective policy with a formal monotonicity invariant that extending a chain can only tighten the result, blocking incompatible combinations before any tool executes. Outputs of any tool call propagate their classification constraints into a session-level taint state, so subsequent invocations must satisfy the most restrictive constraints seen so far. In Phase 2, at runtime, the system tracks the sensitivity of data the agent touches through a monotonic taint state and revokes the session if the accumulated exposure would make a subsequent tool call a policy violation. Together, these phases provide defense in depth, where static composition prevents unsafe chains from starting, and runtime taint tracking catches violations that emerge from the specific data used. We provide a reference implementation on 32 tools governed by 16 NIST SP 800-53 aligned policies and evaluate it under two composition modes. In the default clearance mode, permitted combinations are partitioned into classification-level clusters, blocking 79.2% of policy pairs and 95.5% of triples. The alternative taint mode admits mixed-classification chains within the exfiltration boundary, blocking 42.5% and 60.5% respectively. We discuss the governance implications for organizations deploying multi-tool agents, including the utility-security tradeoff and the changes needed to operationalize chain-aware policies.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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