AI 中文总结
针对垄断者需揭示消费者需求以确定价格和数量的生产经济，引入内生持股拍卖，其特征是拍卖利润按拍卖过程中确定的持股比例在垄断者和消费者之间分配，并基于标准公理刻画该类及更大类拍卖，最后研究无先验支配和主观预期福利下的最优拍卖。
AI 中文摘要
我们为生产经济引入了内生持股拍卖，其中垄断者必须揭示消费者需求以确定价格和数量。这些拍卖中的每一个都具有以下性质：拍卖的利润根据在拍卖过程中确定的持股比例在垄断者和消费者之间分配。我们基于标准公理刻画了该类拍卖以及一个更大的类。最后，我们根据无先验支配和主观预期福利研究了最优拍卖。
英文摘要
We introduce endogenous shareholding auctions for production economies where a monopolist must elicit consumer demand in order to determine price and quantity. Each of these auctions has the property that the auction's profit is distributed across the monopolist and the consumers in accordance with ownership shares that are determined over the course of the auction. We characterize this class, and a larger class, on the basis of standard axioms. Finally, we investigate optimal auctions according to both prior-free domination and subjective expected welfare.
CommentsIn the first version, we used a water system to provide intuition about valvular auctions, but our description of this water system was incorrect due to some inadvertent oversimplifications. This has been fixed: we revised our description of the water system in Section 2, and we revised Figure 2 to illustrate the process in detail across multiple steps
