Local LLM agents such as OpenClaw and Nanobot run on end-user machines and act on host resources - the shell, filesystem, browser, stored credentials, and messaging applications - through natural-language goals. These agents have become privileged software runtimes that mediate between user intent, model outputs, and host-level actions. Existing research characterizes the landscape through prompt injection, malicious skills, marketplace risks, or black-box evaluation of agents. But the implementation layer that performs this mediation, the prompt builder, parser, tool dispatcher, skill loader, memory writer, network client, and permission gate, has remained an unexamined safety boundary. To our knowledge, no prior work has examined the agent's source tree to audit these components for implementation-level security weaknesses. We present CLAWAUDIT, a static auditing framework for measuring vulnerability exposure in local LLM agent runtimes. CLAWAUDIT derives a five-category vulnerability taxonomy from STRIDE and develops custom static-analysis rules that target agent-specific patterns absent from established rule sets for vulnerability analysis. We instantiate the taxonomy in two backends, 47 Semgrep YAML rules and 30 CodeQL queries, and evaluate on OPENCLAWBENCH, a benchmark of 446 source-code-level advisories from the OpenClaw repository and split temporally into 229 rule-derivation (train) and 217 held-out (test) advisories. On the held-out test, CLAWAUDIT raises Semgrep recall from 21.7% (Pro baseline) to 66.8%, and CodeQL recall from 13.8% (security-extended) to 75.1%. Train/test gaps remain within 4 percentage points for all four configurations, indicating that the rules generalize to vulnerabilities unseen during rule writing. A preliminary live-code audit shows that these recall-oriented rules require manual triage, motivating semantic filtering before production deployment.
An Organization-Scoped LLM Agent Runtime Architecture for Regulated Cybersecurity Operations
Innov-Acts Ltd(Innov-Acts有限公司);Dept. of Digital Systems University of Piraeus(数字系统系希腊比雷埃克斯大学);Harokopio University(哈罗基奥大学);Dept. of Informatics and Telematics(信息学与电信系)
Towards Security-Auditable LLM Agents: A Unified Graph Representation
Huazhong University of Science and Technology(华中科技大学);Nanyang Technological University(南洋理工大学);Fudan University(复旦大学);Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications(重庆邮电大学);Donghua University(东华大学)
SoK: Large Language Model Copyright Auditing via Fingerprinting
The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security(区块链与数据安全国家重点实验室);Hangzhou High-Tech Zone (Binjiang) Institute of Blockchain and Data Security(杭州高新技术区(滨江)区块链与数据安全研究院);Nanyang Technological University(南洋理工大学);City University of Hong Kong(香港城市大学);Sun Yat-Sen University(中山大学)
AgentXploit: Autonomous Repository-to-Runtime Red-Teaming for AI Agents
National University of Singapore(新加坡国立大学);University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill(北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校);University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);University of Chicago(芝加哥大学);University of California, Santa Barbara(加州大学圣巴巴拉分校)
Compile, Then Page: Executable SOP Programs and a Capability-Gated Runtime for Procedural LLM Agents
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University(香港理工大学);The University of Hong Kong(香港大学);Zhejiang Normal University(浙江师范大学);Research Institute for Generative AI, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University(香港理工大学生成式人工智能研究所)
Agentao: A Policy-Governed Runtime Harness for Embeddable Tool-Using LLM Agents
The Third Research Institute of the Ministry of Public Security(公安部第三研究所);Bureau of Science and Technology Information Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China(中华人民共和国公安部科技信息局);School of Information and Cyber Security People’s Public Security University of China(中国人民公安大学信息与网络安全学院)
When Tool Outputs Become Commands: Separating Action Induction from Runtime Authorization in Tool-Augmented LLM Agents
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院信息工程研究所);School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院大学网络空间安全学院)
Token-Flow Firewall: Semantic Runtime Auditing for Persistent AI Agents
State Key Laboratory of AI Safety(人工智能安全国家重点实验室);Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院计算技术研究所);University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China(中国科学院大学北京校区)
GraphEye: A Novel Solution for Detecting Vulnerable Functions Based on Graph Attention Network
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(电子科技大学);National Key Laboratory of Science and Technology on Information System Security(信息系统安全技术国家重点实验室)
Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming
Patronus AI University of California, Berkeley(Patronus AI 伯克利大学)
Smart Contracts Claimed Vulnerable by the CVE Database, with Labels and Source Locations
Institute of Computer Engineering, Informatics, TU Wien(TU Wien 计算机工程与信息学研究所);Division of Theoretical Computer ScienceKTH Royal Institute of Technology(KTH皇家理工学院理论计算机科学系);Institute of Logic and Computation, Informatics, TU Wien(TU Wien 逻辑与计算信息学研究所)