多拟阵服务市场中的可信度三难困境
Credibility Trilemma in Polymatroidal Service Markets
AI总结：
本文研究多拟阵服务市场中市场运营者的策略行为，证明在非模多拟阵上不存在同时满足收益最优、激励兼容和可信的静态密封投标机制，并引入不可信成本度量该困境的福利损失。
摘要：
具有多拟阵可行性的机制中介服务市场允许高效、占优策略激励兼容（DSIC）分配，但这些保证隐含地假设市场运营者诚实执行。将运营者建模为策略性参与者，我们建立了一个可信度三难困境：对于非模多拟阵上的单参数代理，没有静态密封投标机制能同时实现收益最优、对代理DSIC以及对运营者可信。我们引入不可信成本（CoNC）作为类似无政府状态价格的福利损失度量，并在五个拓扑类别（单边、串联、并联、树、串并联）上获得紧的$Θ$界，以及在一般DAG上通过SP增广子族上的$Ω(|\mathcal{S}|)$见证实现匹配的上界$O(|\mathcal{S}|)$，将三难困境转化为一个结构性量。随后给出三种结构上不同的解决方案：公共广播或延迟揭示承诺、结算分离和四个附加条件下的管理域分离、以及不相干参与者下独立于机制执行的集成商竞争。在Amin等人的边定价市场上的实例级验证确认了三难困境在仲裁外部设置上的稳健性。该结果将市场中立性确立为多拟阵服务市场的一阶设计约束而非实现细节：当运营者是策略性参与者时，可信度与收益最优性和代理激励兼容性沿着结构性特征线进行权衡。
英文摘要：
Mechanism-mediated service markets with polymatroidal feasibility admit efficient, dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) allocation, but these guarantees implicitly assume truthful execution by the marketplace operator. Modelling the operator as a strategic player, we establish a credibility trilemma: for single-parameter agents on a non-modular polymatroid carrying a competitive prior profile, no static sealed-bid mechanism is simultaneously revenue-optimal, DSIC for agents, and credible for the operator. We introduce the Cost of Non-Credibility (CoNC) as a price-of-anarchy-style welfare-loss measure and prove a per-triple lower bound scaling with the polymatroid's conditional non-modularity gap; on released instances where capacity binds, its deviation extracts under 0.02% of welfare and phantom insertion 0.9-2.2%, neither destroying welfare. Two resolutions follow: public broadcast or deferred-revelation commitment, and administrative domain separation under settlement separation and four side conditions. On the supply side, an integrator paid a share of its slice's payments can profitably understate capacity, which settlement separation does not prevent and a known-cost envelope rule does. An instance-level grounding over the edge-pricing market of Amin et al. proves the trilemma there and shows that settlement separation closes its price-perturbation channel. Marketplace neutrality is thus a first-order design constraint on polymatroidal service markets.
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