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arXiv 2605.12976cs.CR
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CLOUDBURST:利用信标进行云层观测以实现统一的实时监控和威胁归因

CLOUDBURST: Cloud-Layer Observations Using Beacons for Unified Real-time Surveillance and Threat Attribution

AI-WEINBERG, AI Experts(AI-WEIN伯格,AI专家)

Abraham Itzhak Weinberg

AI总结:

本文提出CLOUDBURST框架,首次系统性地评估云原生被动信标,通过四个主要云服务商的六个向量类别,引入Cloud Attribution Score指标,评估云环境中的威胁归因能力。

摘要:

现代云原生环境相较于传统文件基场景呈现了根本不同的外泄威胁面。攻击者针对AWS、GCP、Azure和OCI偷取S3预签名URL、容器镜像、Kubernetes密钥、Terraform状态模块和IAM角色令牌——这些现有蜜罐和信标框架未涉及的物品。我们提出CLOUDBURST,首个正式的云原生被动信标分类和测量框架,涵盖四个主要云服务提供商的六个向量类别。我们引入云归因分数(CAS),一个四维指标,明确建模临时基础设施惩罚(E_p)、IAM覆盖深度(I_c)和多云关联奖励(M_b)——这些维度此前所有归因质量指标均未涉及。实验涵盖21个部署的信标、205个模拟回调和三个攻击者复杂程度级别,得出四个主要发现。首先,IAM Canary角色实现最高CAS(均值0.450)和检测抵抗性(DR=0.873),使其成为最可部署的向量。其次,S3预签名URL实现最高检测抵抗性(DR=0.890),在所有三个云原生扫描器模型(AWS Macie、Checkov/tfsec、Prisma Cloud/Wiz)中存活。第三,临时基础设施 churn 使CAS从部署时的约0.79下降到48小时后的约0.18-0.22(p<0.001),建立了首个容器化环境中的归因衰减定量模型。第四,无服务器函数触发器由于其显式的外部HTTP回调模式表现出最差的检测抵抗性(DR=0.611),推动了隐蔽回调通道设计作为未来工作。没有观察到云服务提供商之间的显著CAS差异(H=1.99,p=0.57),证实了CLOUDBURST在有效性上的云服务提供商无关性。

英文摘要:

Modern cloud-native environments present a fundamentally different exfiltration threat surface than traditional file-based scenarios. Attackers targeting AWS, GCP, Azure, and OCI steal S3 presigned URLs, container images, Kubernetes secrets, Terraform state modules, and IAM role tokens -- artefacts that existing honeytoken and beacon frameworks do not address. We present \textbf{CLOUDBURST}, the first formal taxonomy and measurement framework for cloud-native passive beacons, comprising six vector classes across four major cloud providers. We introduce the \textit{Cloud Attribution Score} (CAS), a four-component metric that explicitly models ephemeral infrastructure penalty ($E_p$), IAM coverage depth ($I_c$), and multi-cloud correlation bonus ($M_b$) -- dimensions absent from all prior attribution quality metrics. Experiments across $21$ deployed beacons, $205$ simulated callbacks, and three attacker sophistication levels yield four principal findings. First, IAM Canary Roles achieve the highest CAS (mean $0.450$) and Detection Resistance (DR $= 0.873$), making them the most deployable vector. Second, S3 Presigned URLs achieve the highest detection resistance (DR $= 0.890$), surviving all three cloud-native scanner models (AWS Macie, Checkov/tfsec, Prisma Cloud/Wiz). Third, ephemeral infrastructure churn degrades CAS from $\approx 0.79$ at deployment to $\approx 0.18$--$0.22$ at $48$ hours for all vectors ($p < 0.001$), establishing the first quantitative model of attribution decay in containerised environments. Fourth, Serverless Function Triggers exhibit the worst detection resistance (DR $= 0.611$) due to their explicit outbound HTTP callback pattern, motivating covert callback channel design as future work. No significant CAS difference is observed across cloud providers ($H = 1.99$, $p = 0.57$), confirming that CLOUDBURST is provider-agnostic in its effectiveness.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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