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arXiv 2605.03230cs.CR
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SILMARILS: 信息论和量子安全的指定验证者签名

SILMARILS: Information-Theoretic and Quantum-Secure Designated-Verifier Signatures

The University of British Columbia (UBC)(不列颠哥伦比亚大学);EternaX Labs(EternaX实验室)

Hassan Khodaiemehr, Khadijeh Bagheri, Chen Feng, Dariia Porechna

AI总结:

SILMARILS基于有限域上的最小代数核心,结合真实随机性和完美2-2 Shamir秘密共享,实现了可转移的指定验证者签名方案,提供了信息论和量子安全性的保障。

摘要:

SILMARILS是基于有限域上的最小代数核心,使用真实随机性和完美2-2 Shamir秘密共享构建的。该框架支持两方和三方模式。在两方模式下,SILMARILS实现了一种可转移的指定验证者(TDV)签名方案。指定验证者可以模拟接受证词,使其与真实证词不可区分,达到Jakobsson-Sako-Impagliazzo DV安全级别。验证者可以发布收据r以供公开验证,但即使有r,外部任何人都无法确定证词是否被签名或模拟。由于DV签名允许模拟,标准EUF-CMA不能对指定验证者成立;相反,我们证明在随机预言模型(ROM)和量子随机预言模型(QROM)中,所有非指定验证者都满足EUF-CMA^{ eg DV}安全性。在三方模式下,采用Fitzi等人提出的广播模型,我们获得一个统计安全的签名协议,具有基于模拟的安全性和误差1/p。我们分析了纯IT模型、IT+ROM和QROM中的安全性,将Fitzi等人的框架扩展到具有经典输入输出的量子对手。对于非指定方,正确性、保密性、可转移性和不可伪造性与基于模拟的安全性等价。得益于其简单的代数结构,SILMARILS为区块链设置提供了非常紧凑的密钥和签名,其中标准化的PQC方案已经足够。我们的目标不是比较SILMARILS与PQC,而是突出其在轻量级TDV认证中的适用性。由于空间限制和对齐模型的复杂性,与其他DV方案的公平比较被省略。

英文摘要:

SILMARILS is built from a minimal algebraic core over $\mathbb{F}_p$ using true randomness and perfect $2$-out-of-$2$ Shamir secret sharing. The framework supports both two-party and three-party modes. In the two-party setting, SILMARILS realizes a transferable designated-verifier (TDV) signature scheme. The designated verifier can simulate accepting transcripts indistinguishable from real ones, achieving Jakobsson-Sako-Impagliazzo DV security. The verifier may publish a receipt $r$ enabling public verification, yet even with $r$, no external party can tell whether a transcript was signed or simulated. As DV signatures permit simulation, standard EUF-CMA cannot hold for the designated verifier; instead, we prove $\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}^{\neg\mathsf{DV}}$ security for all non-designated verifiers in both the random oracle model (ROM) and quantum random oracle model (QROM). In the three-party mode, adopting the broadcast model of Fitzi et al., we obtain a statistically secure signature protocol with simulation-based security and error $1/p$. We analyze security in the Pure IT model, the IT+ROM, and the QROM, extending the Fitzi et al. framework to quantum adversaries with classical I/O. Correctness, secrecy, transferability, and unforgeability for non-designated parties remain equivalent to simulation-based security. Thanks to its simple algebraic structure, SILMARILS offers very compact keys and signatures for the blockchain settings we target, where standardized PQC schemes are already more than sufficient. Our goal is not to compare SILMARILS with PQC, but to highlight its suitability for lightweight TDV authentication. A fair comparison with other DV schemes is omitted due to space and the complexity of aligning models.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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