区间选举中Thiele规则及其推广的计算
Computing Thiele Rules on Interval Elections and their Generalizations
AI总结:
本文研究了区间选举中Thiele规则的计算问题,发现其在候选区间域内可通过线性规划高效求解,但在选民区间域内则存在NP难性,并提出了新的域扩展方法。
摘要:
在区间选举中,Thiele规则及其推广的计算问题受到社会选择领域的广泛关注。其中,Thiele规则,尤其是比例同意投票(PAV),因其具有比例代表、帕累托最优和支持单调性等 desirable 属性而脱颖而出。其主要缺点是计算Thiele结果在一般情况下是NP难的。然而,由于在结构化偏好下Thiele规则表现更佳,这为问题提供了一丝希望。在候选区间(CI)域上,通过一个具有完全单模矩阵约束的线性规划(LP)可在多项式时间内计算。令人惊讶的是,这种方法在相关的选民区间(VI)域上失效,且该问题的复杂性曾被反复提出作为开放问题。我们的主要结果解决了这一问题:虽然相关矩阵不完全单模,但“标准”LP仍然至少有一个最优整数解,我们提供了一种快速算法来找到它。我们的技术自然扩展到选民-候选人区间(VCI)域,也称为一维选民-候选人范围(1D-VCR)域,以及线性一致(LC)域,两者均扩展了候选和选民区间域。尽管VCI和LC域已在社会选择领域研究,但它们之间的关系尚不清楚。我们通过与图论的联系,证明LC严格包含VCI。我们还提供了一种更接近VCI精神的LC替代定义,并具有自然的批准选举解释;这种等价性可能具有独立价值。最后,我们研究了一种替代的树形VCI扩展,并展示在该域上Thiele规则的计算变得NP难。
英文摘要:
Approval-based committee voting has received significant attention in the social choice community. Among the studied rules, Thiele rules, and especially Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), stand out for desirable properties such as proportional representation, Pareto optimality, and support monotonicity. Their main drawback is that computing a Thiele outcome is NP-hard in general. A glimpse of hope comes from the fact that Thiele rules are better behaved under structured preferences. On the candidate interval (CI) domain, they are computable in polynomial time via a linear program (LP) that has a totally unimodular constraint matrix. Surprisingly, this approach fails for the related voter interval (VI) domain, and the complexity of the problem has repeatedly been posed as an open question. Our main result resolves this question: although the relevant matrix is not totally unimodular, the ``standard'' LP still admits at least one optimal integral solution, and we provide a fast algorithm for finding it. Our technique naturally extends to the voter-candidate interval (VCI) domain, also known as the 1-dimensional voter-candidate range (1D-VCR) domain, and to the linearly consistent (LC) domain, both of which generalize the candidate and voter interval domains. Although both the VCI and LC domains have been studied in social choice, their relationship was unknown. We show, through connections to graph theory, that LC strictly contains VCI. We also provide an alternative definition of LC that is closer in spirit to VCI and has a natural interpretation in approval elections; this equivalence may be of independent interest. Finally, we study an alternative tree-based generalization of VCI and show that Thiele rules become NP-hard to compute on this domain.
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