重写响应路径:BYOK LLM 代理中的静默篡改与提供者签名防御
Rewriting the Response Path: Silent Tampering and Provider-Signed Defense in BYOK LLM Agents
AI总结:
研究BYOK LLM代理响应路径完整性问题,发现中继可篡改响应。提出sign-c服务器端方案,能认证执行承载字段和查询,本地垫片验证,加密保护机密性,防御有效拒绝篡改响应,误拒率为零,延迟开销低。
摘要:
LLM 代理将模型输出转换为相应行动,包括通信、代码更改和金融交易。开发者常信赖测试结果和执行日志等证据。我们发现约88%主流代理使用的自带密钥配置中存在响应路径完整性差距。因流量经用户授权中继,中继可在对齐后、执行前修改明文LLM响应且不破坏加密。最小攻击重写一个执行承载字段并使用用户密钥重新生成其余响应。实验揭示了错误的绿色验证,恶意代码修改能通过公开测试却悄悄绕过安全检查。我们提出了sign-c,一种服务器端方案,能对执行承载字段和传出查询进行认证,本地垫片在行动前验证,加密保护机密性。该防御拒绝了所有篡改响应,误拒率为零,延迟开销仅0.0167%。
英文摘要:
LLM agents convert model outputs into consequential actions, including communications, code changes, and financial transactions. Developers often trust evidence such as test results and execution logs. We identify a response path integrity gap in Bring Your Own Key configurations used by roughly 88 percent of mainstream agents. Because traffic passes through a user-authorized relay, the relay can modify plaintext LLM responses after alignment but before execution without breaking encryption. A minimal attack rewrites one execution bearing field and regenerates the remaining response using the user key while preserving the model style. Experiments reveal false green verification, where malicious code modifications pass public tests while silently defeating security checks. On APPS, 99.7 percent of publicly passing solutions retained downgraded behavior without developer-visible warnings. Tests on SWE bench, AgentDojo, and ASB across five frontier models show that single-field rewriting can redirect agents while preserving apparent task completion. We propose sign-c, a server-side scheme that authenticates execution bearing fields and outgoing queries. A local shim verifies them before action, while encryption protects confidentiality. The defense rejected all tampered responses with zero false rejections and only 0.0167 percent latency overhead.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。