零和思维对代理利益的损害在正和世界中有多大?
How damaging is zero-sum thinking to an agent's interests when the world is positive-sum?
AI总结:
研究零和决策规则(maximin和minimax)在正和战略环境中的影响,发现maximin在某些情况下比纳什均衡更有利于代理利益,且两者在游戏类别上具有相同的数量级。
摘要:
我们研究零和决策规则,即maximin和minimax,是否在正和战略环境中损害代理的利益,相对于纳什均衡行为或更一般的最佳回应行为。与有影响力的进化观点相反,我们提供了示例表明maximin比纳什均衡行为更有利于代理的利益。我们还表明这些示例并不典型或特殊,因为在我们的主要结果中,一类这样的游戏,其中maximin配置严格帕累托优于所有纳什均衡,其数量与一类游戏中纳什均衡严格帕累托优于所有maximin配置的数量相同。因此,两种行为都不是普遍更优。我们进一步识别了 favoring maximin over Nash equilibrium 的额外机制,包括在多个均衡下的协调失败,其中maximin可以在实际支付结果中表现更好。对严格序数对称3x3游戏的系统分析表明,这些影响在非平凡频率下出现。因此,我们的发现表明,观察到的许多发达国家中零和思维的上升,当与maximin决策规则结合时,不会轻易通过其产生劣质支付来被取代。
英文摘要:
We study whether zero-sum decision rules, maximin and minimax, harm agents' interests in positive-sum games relative to Nash equilibrium behaviour or, more generally, than best response behaviour. Contrary to an influential evolutionary view, we give illustrations where maximin serves an agent's interests better than Nash equilibrium behaviour. Two new sets of results show that these illustrations are not idiosyncratic. First, for any selected Nash equilibrium in cardinal games, we construct a strategically equivalent game where a maximin profile yields the same pay-offs and we fully characterise when maximin can be made to Pareto dominate that Nash equilibrium and the entire Nash equilibrium set. Second, we show that the relevant Maximin Pareto dominance classes are not knife-edge: they are generically interior, and strict maximin profile dominance occurs on a non-empty open set if and only if a player has at least two actions and the other has at least three.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。