天空中的故障:利用电压故障注入攻击无人机飞行控制器
Glitch in the Sky: Exploiting Voltage Fault Injection in UAV Flight Controllers
AI总结:
研究无人机飞行控制器在电压故障注入攻击下的脆弱性,通过软件和硬件实验揭示时间敏感性漏洞,验证故障注入对 CPS 安全性的影响。
摘要:
随着嵌入式逻辑的可靠性变得越来越关键,确保 CPS 的安全性至关重要。本文研究了电压故障注入对无人机自动驾驶仪故障安全机制的易受攻击性。我们介绍了双评估方法:使用 ARMORY 进行软件故障模拟和使用电压故障平台(Chip-Whisperer)进行硬件实验,对 STM32 微控制器上的 UAV 自动驾驶仪故障安全逻辑应用受控和及时的故障。我们的特定故障安全模式分析揭示了时间敏感性漏洞,这些漏洞可以抑制或改变安全响应,例如在关键时刻禁用紧急故障安全激活,可能使无人机被劫持。此外,我们验证了软件故障注入结果与真实硬件行为的一致性,展示了模拟攻击如何转化为 CPS 安全性和可靠性的真实风险。
英文摘要:
As Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) become increasingly pervasive and autonomous, ensuring the resilience of their embedded logic is critical to maintaining safety and integrity. Among the most stealthy and damaging threats are non-invasive fault injection attacks, where hardware-level disturbances propagate into software execution and compromise control logic. In this paper, we investigate the susceptibility of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) autopilot fail-safe mechanisms to voltage glitch fault injection. We introduce a dual evaluation approach: software-based fault simulation using ARMORY and hardware-based experiments with a voltage glitching platform (Chip-Whisperer), applying controlled and timely faults to an STM32 microcontroller running UAV-Autopilot fail-safe logic. Our targeted analysis of specific fail-safe modes uncovers timing-sensitive vulnerabilities that can suppress or alter safety responses, such as disabling emergency failsafe activation at critical moments, potentially enabling UAV hijacking. Furthermore, we validate software-based fault injection results against real hardware behavior, demonstrating how simulated attacks translate into tangible risks for CPS security and reliability.
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