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arXiv 2604.14734cs.CV

找出差异:差分形态攻击检测与面部识别

Find the Differences: Differential Morphing Attack Detection vs Face Recognition

Data Management and Biometrics, University of Twente, Enschede, the Netherlands(数据管理与生物特征识别,特文特大学,埃舍德,荷兰);Machine Learning and Data Engineering, University of Münster, Münster, Germany(机器学习与数据工程,明斯特大学,明斯特,德国)

Una M. Kelly, Luuk J. Spreeuwers, Raymond N. J. Veldhuis

AI总结:

本文指出面部识别与差分形态攻击检测本质上相似,通过比较FR系统与现有D-MAD方法,揭示决策阈值导致FR系统易受形态攻击,并提出新评估阈值以限制未知类型攻击的脆弱性。

摘要:

形态攻击是面部识别面临的挑战,已有多种形态攻击检测解决方案。我们论证面部识别与差分形态攻击检测(D-MAD)本质上执行非常相似的任务,并通过比较FR系统与两种现有D-MAD方法予以支持。我们还显示,目前使用的决策阈值本质上导致FR系统易受形态攻击,并解释了正常图像性能与对形态攻击的易受性之间的权衡。我们提出利用已有的FR系统进行形态检测,并引入一个新的评估阈值,以保证对形态攻击的脆弱性上限——即使攻击类型未知。

英文摘要:

Morphing is a challenge to face recognition (FR) for which several morphing attack detection solutions have been proposed. We argue that face recognition and differential morphing attack detection (D-MAD) in principle perform very similar tasks, which we support by comparing an FR system with two existing D-MAD approaches. We also show that currently used decision thresholds inherently lead to FR systems being vulnerable to morphing attacks and that this explains the tradeoff between performance on normal images and vulnerability to morphing attacks. We propose using FR systems that are already in place for morphing detection and introduce a new evaluation threshold that guarantees an upper limit to the vulnerability to morphing attacks - even of unknown types.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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