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arXiv 2604.14014cs.SEcs.CR
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GitHub上提交签名的分析

Analysis of Commit Signing on Github

University of Tennessee(田纳西大学)

Abubakar Sadiq Shittu, John Sadik, Farzin Gholamrezae, Scott Ruoti

AI总结:

研究分析GitHub提交签名的使用情况,发现签名率 misleading,开发者难以保持一致性,签名 lapse率随账户年龄增加,开发者管理签名密钥不当,导致供应链安全框架假设不成立。

摘要:

提交签名是软件供应链中验证代码来源的主要机制。安全框架将其视为核心信任信号,假设开发者一致使用他们控制的密钥并保持密钥良好状态。是否在实际中成立尚未在生态系统层面评估。本研究填补这一空白。我们提出了首个以开发者为中心、生态系统层面的GitHub提交签名测量,涵盖平台完整历史,覆盖71,694名活跃开发者、1610万次提交和874,198个仓库。总结发现:(1)总体签名采用率具有误导性,因为大多数签名提交来自自动平台签名而非开发者主动行为;(2)本地签名的开发者很少在不同仓库或时间保持一致性;(3)签名中断率随着账户年龄增加而非减少,使持续覆盖在结构上不可能;(4)开发者管理签名密钥不佳,导致过期密钥未撤销,凭证债务随时间增长。我们的发现表明,供应链安全框架的假设在实践中不成立,表明进展需要重新设计签名凭证以与开发者身份绑定,同时保持在平台控制之外,或构建不依赖每个开发者管理自身密钥的框架。

英文摘要:

Securing the open-source software supply chain requires verifying the provenance of every code contribution. While end-to-end (E2E) cryptographic commit signing is widely promoted to achieve this, little is known about how developers actually use it at scale. We fill this gap by analyzing 2,737,649 GitHub accounts, identifying 71,694 active contributors, and examining 16,112,439 commits across 874,198 repositories to characterize their commit-signing and key-management practices throughout GitHub's history. We demonstrate that the vast majority of signed activity is generated automatically by GitHub's web interface rather than by individual developers. Genuine E2E commit signing is exceptionally rare, and the few developers who adopt it practice it erratically, frequently abandoning it over time or leaving expired keys unrevoked. Ultimately, we show that manual key management creates a false sense of security across the open-source community, and we outline structural platform interventions to resolve this failure.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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