Cerisier:一种用于能力机中证明的程序逻辑
Cerisier: A Program Logic for Attestation in a Capability Machine
AI总结:
本文提出Cerisier程序逻辑,用于模块化推理可信、不可信和证明代码,支持验证端到端属性,适用于可信计算的三个应用。
摘要:
可信计算中的关键特性是证明,允许封装组件(内核)向(本地或远程)不可信组件证明其身份。推理使用该技术的软件需要跟踪信任在成功证明后的演变。这一过程至关重要且非 trivial,但现有形式验证技术无法支持模块化推理关于内核和其客户端的证明,或证明结合可信、不可信和证明代码的系统端到端属性。我们贡献了Cerisier,这是首个用于模块化推理可信、不可信和证明代码的程序逻辑,完全在Iris分离逻辑和Rocq Prover中机械化。我们正式化了最近的提案,CHERI-TrEE,以扩展能力机的内核原语,作为Cerise能力机和程序逻辑的扩展。我们的程序逻辑附带了一个通用合同用于不可信代码,该合同捕捉了能力和本地内核证明的安全性。与Cerise类似,此通用合同以定义能力权威的逻辑关系来表述。我们通过证明三个代表性的可信计算应用的端到端属性来展示Cerisier:安全外包计算、相互证明和建模的可信传感器组件。
英文摘要:
A key feature in trusted computing is attestation, which allows encapsulated components (enclaves) to prove their identity to (local or remote) distrusting components. Reasoning about software that uses the technique requires tracking how trust evolves after successful attestation. This process is security-critical and non-trivial, but no existing formal verification technique supports modular reasoning about attestation of enclaves and their clients, or proving end-to-end properties for systems combining trusted, untrusted and attested code. We contribute Cerisier, the first program logic for modular reasoning about trusted, untrusted and attested code, fully mechanized in the Iris separation logic and the Rocq Prover. We formalize a recent proposal, CHERI-TrEE, to extend capability machines with enclave primitives, as an extension to the Cerise capability machine and program logic. Our program logic comes with a universal contract for untrusted code, which captures both capability safety and local enclave attestation. Like Cerise, this universal contract is phrased in terms of a logical relation defining capabilities' authority. We demonstrate Cerisier by proving end-to-end properties for three representative applications of trusted computing: secure outsourced computation, mutual attestation and a modeled trusted sensor component.
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