arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2603.28655cs.CR
收藏

通过隐写术可以ary文件保护LLM免受滥用及AI驱动的恶意软件

Safeguarding LLMs Against Misuse and AI-Driven Malware Using Steganographic Canaries

New York University(纽约大学)

Md Raz, Venkata Sai Charan Putrevu, Meet Udeshi, Prashanth Krishnamurthy, Farshad Khorrami, Ramesh Karri

AI总结:

本文提出基于隐写术canary文件的框架,用于检测未经授权的LLM处理,通过两种模式实现符号和语言隐写术的结合,有效识别敏感文档。

摘要:

AI驱动的恶意软件越来越多地利用云托管的生成式AI服务和大语言模型(LLMs)作为分析引擎进行侦察和代码生成。同时,企业上传的敏感文档暴露于第三方AI供应商。这两种威胁在AI服务摄入边界交汇,但现有防御集中在端点和网络边界,使组织在plaintext到达LLM服务后缺乏可见性。为此,我们提出基于隐写术canary文件的框架:真实文档携带通过互补编码通道嵌入的加密生成标识符。在LLM处理前,预摄入过滤器提取并验证这些标识符,实现被动、格式无关的检测,无需语义分类。我们支持两种操作模式,模式A通过分层符号编码(空格替换、零宽度字符插入、同形替换)标记现有敏感文档,而模式B利用语言隐写术(基于GPT-2的算术编码)生成合成canary文档,辅以兼容的符号层。我们通过四层运输-转换分类法建模增加的文档预处理和对抗能力:所有方法在良性及净化流程(第1-2层)中实现100%标识符恢复。混合模式B在针对对抗性转换(第3层)中保持97%的恢复率。一个端到端的案例研究针对LLM驱动的勒索软件管道确认,两种模式在文件加密开始前检测并阻止携带canary的上传。据我们所知,这是首个系统结合符号和语言文本隐写术到分层canary文档以检测未经授权LLM处理的框架,评估基于针对AI恶意软件定制的运输威胁分类法。

英文摘要:

AI-powered malware increasingly exploits cloud-hosted generative-AI services and large language models (LLMs) as analysis engines for reconnaissance and code generation. Simultaneously, enterprise uploads expose sensitive documents to third-party AI vendors. Both threats converge at the AI service ingestion boundary, yet existing defenses focus on endpoints and network perimeters, leaving organizations with limited visibility once plaintext reaches an LLM service. To address this, we present a framework based on steganographic canary files: realistic documents carrying cryptographically derived identifiers embedded via complementary encoding channels. A pre-ingestion filter extracts and verifies these identifiers before LLM processing, enabling passive, format-agnostic detection without semantic classification. We support two modes of operation where Mode A marks existing sensitive documents with layered symbolic encodings (whitespace substitution, zero-width character insertion, homoglyph substitution), while Mode B generates synthetic canary documents using linguistic steganography (arithmetic coding over GPT-2), augmented with compatible symbolic layers. We model increasing document pre-processing and adversarial capability for both modes via a four-tier transport-transform taxonomy: All methods achieve 100% identifier recovery under benign and sanitization workflows (Tiers 1-2). The hybrid Mode B maintains 97% through targeted adversarial transforms (Tier 3). An end-to-end case study against an LLM-orchestrated ransomware pipeline confirms that both modes detect and block canary-bearing uploads before file encryption begins. To our knowledge, this is the first framework to systematically combine symbolic and linguistic text steganography into layered canary documents for detecting unauthorized LLM processing, evaluated against a transport-threat taxonomy tailored to AI malware.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑