Dataset Condensation (DC) is a data-efficient learning paradigm that synthesizes small yet informative datasets, enabling models to match the performance of full-data training. However, recent work exposes a critical vulnerability of DC to backdoor attacks, where malicious patterns (\textit{e.g.}, triggers) are implanted into the condensation dataset, inducing targeted misclassification on specific inputs. Existing attacks always prioritize attack effectiveness and model utility, overlooking the crucial dimension of stealthiness. To bridge this gap, we propose InkDrop, which enhances the imperceptibility of malicious manipulation without degrading attack effectiveness and model utility. InkDrop leverages the inherent uncertainty near model decision boundaries, where minor input perturbations can induce semantic shifts, to construct a stealthy and effective backdoor attack. Specifically, InkDrop first selects candidate samples near the target decision boundary that exhibit latent semantic affinity to the target class. It then learns instance-dependent perturbations constrained by perceptual and spatial consistency, embedding targeted malicious behavior into the condensed dataset. Extensive experiments across diverse datasets validate the overall effectiveness of InkDrop, demonstrating its ability to integrate adversarial intent into condensed datasets while preserving model utility and minimizing detectability. Our code is available at https://github.com/lvdongyi/InkDrop.
Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks via Steganography and Regularization
Shanghai Jiao Tong University(上海交通大学);The University of Adelaide(阿德莱德大学);The University of New South Wales(新南威尔士大学);Data61 CSIRO(澳大利亚联邦科学与工业研究组织 Data61);Shanghai Institute for Advanced Communication and Data Science(上海先进通信与数据科学研究院);Shanghai University(上海大学)
Tsinghua Shenzhen International Graduate School, Tsinghua University(清华大学深圳国际研究生院);The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University(浙江大学区块链与数据安全国家重点实验室);College of Computing and Data Science, Nanyang Technological University(南洋理工大学计算与数据科学学院);School of Computer Science, Wuhan University(武汉大学计算机学院);Tencent Data Platform(腾讯数据平台);Research Center of Artificial Intelligence, Peng Cheng Laboratory(鹏城实验室人工智能研究中心);School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University(武汉大学网络安全学院)
BadCM: Invisible Backdoor Attack Against Cross-Modal Learning
School of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen(哈尔滨工业大学(深圳)计算机科学与技术学院);Peng Cheng Laboratory(鹏城实验室);School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Tongji University(同济大学电子与信息工程学院);School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(电子科技大学计算机科学与工程学院)
Cryptographic Backdoor for Neural Networks: Boon and Bane
College of Computing and Data Science, Nanyang Technological University Singapore(南洋理工大学计算与数据科学学院);Applied Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute(印度统计研究所应用统计单位)
When Stronger Triggers Backfire: A High-Dimensional Theory of Backdoor Attacks
Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford(牛津大学数学研究所);School of Mathematical Science, Tel Aviv University(特拉维夫大学数学科学学院);School of Mathematical Science and Computer Science, Tel Aviv University(特拉维夫大学数学科学与计算机科学学院)