通过多智能体拥堵博弈的策略性基础设施设计:联合放置与定价
Strategic Infrastructure Design via Multi-Agent Congestion Games with Joint Placement and Pricing
AI总结:
本文提出一种多智能体框架,用于在战略互动下联合进行资源放置和定价决策,通过双层优化模型减少社会成本,实验表明在电动汽车充电领域可降低40%的社会成本。
摘要:
现实中的基础设施规划日益涉及自主代理在拥堵和有限资源上的战略互动。应用如电动汽车充电、应急响应和智能交通需要协调资源放置和定价决策,同时预测去中心化、自利代理的适应性行为。本文提出了一种新的多智能体框架,形式化为双层优化模型。上层代表中央规划者,下层通过耦合非原子拥堵博弈捕捉代理响应。受电动汽车充电领域启发,研究了中央规划者在预算和盈利约束下提供充电桩和道路容量的场景。代理群体包括电动汽车驾驶员和非充电驾驶员(NCDs),他们对拥堵、延迟和成本作出反应。为了解决由此产生的NP难问题,我们引入ABO-MPN,一种双层近似框架,解耦代理类型,应用整数调整和取整,并针对高影响的放置和定价决策。在基准网络上的实验表明,我们的模型相比仅放置或定价的基线减少了40%的社会成本,并可推广到其他多智能体相关领域。
英文摘要:
Real-world infrastructure planning increasingly involves strategic interactions among autonomous agents competing over congestible, limited resources. Applications such as Electric Vehicle (EV) charging, emergency response, and intelligent transportation require coordinated resource placement and pricing decisions, while anticipating the adaptive behaviour of decentralised, self-interested agents. We propose a novel multi-agent framework for joint placement and pricing under such interactions, formalised as a bi-level optimisation model. The upper level represents a central planner, while the lower level captures agent responses via coupled non-atomic congestion games. Motivated by the EV charging domain, we study a setting where a central planner provisions chargers and road capacity under budget and profitability constraints. The agent population includes both EV drivers and non-charging drivers (NCDs), who respond to congestion, delays, and costs. To solve the resulting NP-hard problem, we introduce ABO-MPN, a double-layer approximation framework that decouples agent types, applies integer adjustment and rounding, and targets high-impact placement and pricing decisions. Experiments on benchmark networks show that our model reduces social cost by up to 40% compared to placement- or pricing-only baselines, and generalises to other MAS-relevant domains.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。