提前拍卖中的即时 resale：一项事件研究
Just-in-Time Resale in an Ahead-of-Time Auction for Faster Execution
AI总结：
本文研究了Kairos采纳后Arbitrum的Timeboost机制，发现提前拍卖的竞争显著下降，Arbitrum捕获的价值份额减小，且付费投标仅占最高投标的14.8%。
摘要：
我们研究了Kairos被其主要用户Wintermute和Selini Capital采用后Arbitrum的Timeboost机制，以了解即时二级市场出现如何影响提前拍卖的动态。我们发现提前拍卖的竞争显著下降，Arbitrum捕获的价值份额减小。过渡后，提前拍卖的付费投标仅占最高投标的14.8%（相比之下，在Pre-Kairos时代为近62.7%），且占搜索者利润和损失（PnL）的比例更小，尽管总PnL在不同制度下保持相似。虽然剩余盈余在搜索者和Kairos之间的分配仍不明确，但证据表明，大量盈余不再通过提前拍卖捕获。更广泛地说，我们的发现表明，当主导参与者之间的竞争较弱时，提前分配机制可能特别容易受到二级市场中介的影响。我们最后概述了Arbitrum可能改进收入捕获的可能方法，并讨论这些经验如何应用于以太坊L1。
英文摘要：
We study Arbitrum's Timeboost auction, an ahead-of-time mechanism that sells a 200ms ordering advantage in an otherwise first-come, first-served transaction ordering policy. The market naturally divides into two phases: a competition phase, in which the dominant searchers compete directly in the primary auction, and a coordination phase, in which they source fast-lane access through Kairos, a Just-in-Time resale intermediary. We use auction bids, time-boosted transactions, and on-chain payment traces to study how well ahead-of-time bids predict realized CEX--DEX arbitrage profits and how the emergence of resale changes surplus allocation. We find that ahead-of-time bids are noisy predictors of short-horizon arbitrage profits. During the competition phase, bid--profit correlations are statistically significant but economically modest at the round level, while correlations increase when profits are aggregated over longer horizons. This suggests that bidders can identify favorable market conditions but face substantial uncertainty about the realized value of any individual one-minute fast-lane interval. After the Kairos transition, competition in the primary auction weakens sharply: in our focused transition-analysis window, paid bids fall from 62.7% of the top bid before the transition to 14.8% thereafter, while total searcher profits remain broadly similar. The resulting dynamics are most consistent with coordination through a common intermediary rather than direct competition in the primary auction. More broadly, our findings suggest that ahead-of-time allocation mechanisms can be vulnerable to secondary-market intermediation when competition among dominant participants is weak.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
