多维价格下的更强核心结果
Stronger core results with multidimensional prices
AI总结:
本文研究无货币环境下的一方匹配问题,提出多维价格关联的竞争均衡概念,证明其始终存在并属于拒绝核心,且在无非饱和性设定下展示核心收敛性。
摘要:
我们研究无货币环境下的一方匹配问题。已知在该设定下竞争均衡可能不存在,且强核心可能为空[Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979]。我们提出一种竞争均衡的推广形式,将每个物品与多维价格关联。我们证明该解集概念始终存在,并位于拒绝核心[Konovalov, 2005]中。拒绝核心稳定性严格强于弱核心稳定性:拒绝核心中的分配是弱核心元素,但反之不成立。此外,我们证明当经济规模扩大时,拒绝核心始终收敛到多维价格的竞争均衡集,展示了无非饱和性设定下的核心收敛性。
英文摘要:
We study one-sided matchings with endowments in the absence of money. It is well-known that a competitive equilibrium may not always exist and that the strong core may be empty in this setting [Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979]. We propose a generalization of competitive equilibria that associates each item with a multi-dimensional price. We show that this solution concept always exists and resides within the rejective core [Konovalov, 2005]. Rejective core stability is strictly stronger than weak core stability: allocations in the rejective core are elements of the weak core, but the opposite is not true. Moreover, we show that the rejective core always converges to the set of competitive equilibria with multi-dimensional prices as the economy grows, demonstrating core convergence in a setting without non-satiation.
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