单峰域增强完全无差异:目标规则的特征化
Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default
AI总结:
研究社会在封闭区间内选择公共产品水平的公共决策问题,考虑单峰偏好或完全无差异的个体,特征化了具有默认值的目标规则。
摘要:
我们研究一个公共决策问题,其中有限社会从闭区间中选择公共产品水平。代理人要么有单峰偏好,要么在区间内完全无差异;后者捕捉了 abstention 或 'none of the above' 的立场。我们研究了这种增强的单峰域。在此域上,我们特征化了称为具有默认值的目标规则的类别。我们证明了满射性和 pairwise 策略证明性特征化了这一规则类别。
英文摘要:
We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or a "none of the above" stance within the decision process. We study this augmented single-peaked domain. On this domain, we characterize the class of rules called target rules with a default. We show that onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness characterize this class of rules.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。