Structured Semantic Cloaking for Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models
Institute of High Performance Computing (IHPC), Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), Singapore(高性能计算研究所(IHPC),科技研究局(A*STAR),新加坡);Information Systems Technology and Design Pillar, Singapore University of Technology and Design(信息技术与设计支柱,新加坡科技设计大学)
Xiaobing Sun, Perry Lam, Shaohua Li, Zizhou Wang, Rick Siow Mong Goh, Yong Liu, Liangli Zhen
Modern LLMs employ safety mechanisms that extend beyond surface-level input filtering to latent semantic representations and generation-time reasoning, enabling them to recover obfuscated malicious intent during inference and refuse accordingly, and rendering many surface-level obfuscation jailbreak attacks ineffective. We propose Structured Semantic Cloaking (S2C), a novel multi-dimensional jailbreak attack framework that manipulates how malicious semantic intent is reconstructed during model inference. S2C strategically distributes and reshapes semantic cues such that full intent consolidation requires multi-step inference and long-range co-reference resolution within deeper latent representations. The framework comprises three complementary mechanisms: (1) Contextual Reframing, which embeds the request within a plausible high-stakes scenario to bias the model toward compliance; (2) Content Fragmentation, which disperses the semantic signature of the request across disjoint prompt segments; and (3) Clue-Guided Camouflage, which disguises residual semantic cues while embedding recoverable markers that guide output generation. By delaying and restructuring semantic consolidation, S2C degrades safety triggers that depend on coherent or explicitly reconstructed malicious intent at decoding time, while preserving sufficient instruction recoverability for functional output generation. We evaluate S2C across multiple open-source and proprietary LLMs using HarmBench and JBB-Behaviors, where it improves Attack Success Rate (ASR) by 12.4% and 9.7%, respectively, over the current SOTA. Notably, S2C achieves substantial gains on GPT-5-mini, outperforming the strongest baseline by 26% on JBB-Behaviors. We also analyse which combinations perform best against broad families of models, and characterise the trade-off between the extent of obfuscation versus input recoverability on jailbreak success.
QueryAttack: Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models Using Structured Non-natural Query Language
Tsinghua Shenzhen International Graduate School(清华大学深圳国际研究生院);Pengcheng Laboratory(鹏城实验室);The Chinese University of Hong Kong(香港中文大学);Jilin University(吉林大学);Southwest University(西南大学);University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(电子科技大学);Shenzhen University(深圳大学)
DoubtProbe: Black-Box Jailbreak Defense via Structural Verification and Semantic Auditing
East China Normal University(东华大学);The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)(香港科技大学(广州));Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院信息工程研究所)
M2S: Multi-turn to Single-turn jailbreak in Red Teaming for LLMs
AIM Intelligence(AIM智能研究所);University of Seoul(首尔大学);Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology(韩国科学技术院);Seoul National University(首尔国立大学);Yonsei University(延世大学);Korea Institute of Science and Technology(韩国科学技术院);Kyung Hee University(庆熙大学)
What Intermediate Layers Know: Detecting Jailbreaks from Entropy Dynamics
LMU Munich(慕尼黑大学);relAI – Konrad Zuse School of Excellence in Reliable AI(relAI – 康拉德·楚泽可靠人工智能卓越学校);University of Pisa(比萨大学);Munich Center for Machine Learning(慕尼黑机器学习中心);School of Engineering, Computing and Mathematics, Oxford Brookes University(牛津布鲁克斯大学工程、计算与数学学院)
Exploring the Vulnerability of the Content Moderation Guardrail in Large Language Models via Intent Manipulation
Boise State University(博伊州立大学);University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign(伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校);University of Pittsburgh(匹兹堡大学);New York University(纽约大学);Florida International University(佛罗里达国际大学)
MIRAGE: Multimodal Immersive Reasoning and Guided Exploration for Red-Team Jailbreak Attacks
University of Waterloo(滑铁卢大学);National University of Singapore(新加坡国立大学);University of California, Merced(加州大学默塞德分校);University of Alberta(阿尔伯塔大学);University of Queensland(昆士兰大学)
Reflex-Guard: A Low-Latency Guardrail for LLM Prompt Safety Using Dense Semantic Embeddings
Graduate School of Informatics, Osaka Metropolitan University(大阪公立大学情报学研究科);BRAC University(BRAC大学);Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET)(孟加拉工程技术大学);New Mexico State University(新墨西哥州立大学)