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ClawWorm:针对LLM代理生态系统自主传播的攻击

AgentWorm: Self-Propagating Attacks Across LLM Agent Ecosystems

Peking University(北京大学);Sun Yat-sen University(中山大学);Wuhan University(武汉大学);Tsinghua University(清华大学);Singapore Management University(新加坡管理学院)

Yihao Zhang, Zeming Wei, Xiaokun Luan, Chengcan Wu, Zhixin Zhang, Jiangrong Wu, Haolin Wu, Huanran Chen, Jun Sun, Meng Sun

AI总结:

研究提出ClawWorm,首个自主传播的LLM代理框架攻击,通过单条消息实现持久化感染与多跳传播,揭示模型安全姿态差异及防御策略。

摘要:

自主LLM代理日益作为长期进程运行,形成高度互联的多代理生态系统,其安全性尚待深入研究。本文提出ClawWorm,首个针对生产级代理框架的自主传播蠕虫攻击,通过单条消息实现持久化感染、每次重启执行任意负载,并传播至所有新遇到的节点。在受控测试环境中,针对四个LLM后端、三种感染途径和三种负载类型(共1800次试验),展示了64.5%的攻击成功率、持续多跳传播,并揭示模型安全姿态的显著差异。分析了这些漏洞的架构根本原因,并提出了针对每个识别的信任边界防御策略。代码和样本将在负责任披露完成后发布。

英文摘要:

Autonomous LLM-based agents increasingly operate as long-running processes forming densely interconnected multi-agent ecosystems, whose security properties remain largely unexplored. Systems such as OpenClaw, an open-source platform with over 40{,}000 active instances, persistent configurations, tool-execution privileges, and cross-platform messaging, are deployed at scale, yet the security of such agent ecosystems remains largely unexplored. This work presents AgentWorm, the first self-replicating worm attack against a production-scale agent framework, achieving a fully autonomous infection cycle initiated by a single message: the worm first hijacks the victim's core configuration to establish persistent presence across session restarts, then executes an arbitrary payload upon each reboot, and finally propagates itself to every newly encountered peer without further attacker intervention. The attack is evaluated on a controlled testbed across five distinct LLM backends, three infection vectors, and three payload types. Results show a 63\% aggregate attack success rate, sustained multi-hop propagation, and stark divergences in model security postures, highlighting that while execution-level filtering effectively mitigates dormant payloads, skill supply chains remain universally vulnerable. Defenses are evaluated at three layers (prompt-level mitigations sourced from real community practice, the framework's built-in security controls, and an ecosystem-wide measurement of public configurations), revealing that the critical controls capable of breaking the infection loop are not enabled in any of the observed deployments. A cross-framework transferability experiment on Hermes Agent confirms that the underlying vulnerabilities are properties of the autonomous agent design pattern, not artifacts of a single implementation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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