vCause:面向云基础端点审计的高效且可验证的因果分析
vCause: Efficient and Verifiable Causality Analysis for Cloud-based Endpoint Auditing
AI总结:
vCause通过整合图累积器和可验证溯源图,实现云环境下的高效可验证因果分析,确保因果分析结果的完整性,减少计算开销。
摘要:
在基于云的端点审计中,安全管理员常依赖云平台对日志生成的版本化溯源图进行因果分析以调查可疑攻击行为。然而,云平台可能被攻击者篡改或入侵,从而操控最终的因果分析结果。因此,管理员可能无法准确理解攻击行为并无法实施有效的防护措施。本文提出vCause,一种面向云基础端点审计的高效且可验证的因果分析系统。vCause整合了两种认证数据结构:图累积器和可验证溯源图。这些数据结构使因果分析的两个关键步骤得以验证:(i)在版本化溯源图上查询兴趣点节点;(ii)识别其因果相关组件。形式安全分析和实验评估表明,vCause仅在端点上产生<1%的计算开销,在云上产生3.36%的开销,即可实现安全且可验证的因果分析。
英文摘要:
In cloud-based endpoint auditing, security administrators often rely on the cloud to perform causality analysis over log-derived versioned provenance graphs to investigate suspicious attack behaviors. However, the cloud may be distrusted or compromised by attackers, potentially manipulating the final causality analysis results. Consequently, administrators may not accurately understand attack behaviors and fail to implement effective countermeasures. This risk underscores the need for a defense scheme to ensure the integrity of causality analysis. While existing tamper-evident logging schemes and trusted execution environments show promise for this task, they are not specifically designed to support causality analysis and thus face inherent security and efficiency limitations. This paper presents vCause, an efficient and verifiable causality analysis system for cloud-based endpoint auditing. vCause integrates two authenticated data structures: a graph accumulator and a verifiable provenance graph. The data structures enable validation of two critical steps in causality analysis: (i) querying a point-of-interest node on a versioned provenance graph, and (ii) identifying its causally related components. Formal security analysis and experimental evaluation show that vCause can achieve secure and verifiable causality analysis with only <1% computational overhead on endpoints and 3.36% on the cloud.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。