具有溢出效应的竞赛:利用生成式人工智能激励内容创作
Content Creation with Spillovers: An Incentive Design Approach
AI总结:
本文提出CCS模型,解决GenAI时代内容创作中的溢出效应问题,通过参数化分配机制确保均衡存在,并提供强福利保障。
摘要:
生成式人工智能的兴起放大了正向溢出效应。当创作者贡献可被大语言模型重用和改编的内容时,每位创作者的努力可通过易模仿和重组现有内容来提升他人内容质量。一方面,此类溢出效应为整个生态系统创造价值;另一方面,它们可能削弱创作者投入真实努力的激励,因为他人可能免费受益于其贡献。为了解决这个问题,我们引入了具有溢出效应的内容创作(CCS)模型。在我们的模型中,每位创作者选择一个努力水平,与他人的努力共同决定其内容质量。平台旨在在创作者稳定行为(纯纳什均衡)下最大化消费者的社会福利,但只能观察到最终的质量,而无法观察到底层的努力。有趣的是,简单的机制如赢家通吃和图克洛克会导致均衡不存在。为此,我们提出了一类参数化的分配机制家族,确保均衡存在和唯一的帕累托主导均衡。尽管在该家族中最大化社会福利是NP难的,我们开发了适用于广泛溢出结构类别的近似算法,并提供了强福利保障。具体而言,在最坏情况分析中,我们为有界溢出和树状结构溢出设计了高效的算法。我们还引入了贪心成本选择,一种线性对数时间算法,能够在平均情况分析中实现近似最优结果。共同,我们的结果为GenAI时代的人类内容创作提供了博弈论基础。
英文摘要:
The rise of AI amplifies the economic phenomenon of \emph{positive spillovers}: when creators contribute content that can be reused and adapted by LLMs, one creator's effort may improve the content quality of others through recombination. While such spillovers can improve content quality, they also reshape incentives, as creators may reduce effort when they can benefit from others' contributions. We introduce the \emph{Content Creation with Spillovers} (CCS) model, a game between a platform and strategic creators. In this game, each creator chooses an effort level, and qualities are jointly determined by all creators' efforts. The platform contracts on qualities while seeking to maximize social welfare. We show that standard contest mechanisms can be unstable, and propose a parametrized family of \emph{Provisional Allocation} mechanisms that guarantee a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Although optimizing welfare within this family is hard to approximate in general, we develop approximation algorithms whose guarantees hold either deterministically across structured spillover classes or with high probability under random instances.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。