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arXiv 2603.10028cs.CYcs.AI
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如何计算AI:AI代理的个体化与责任归属

How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents

University of Alabama(阿拉巴马大学);University of Hong Kong(香港大学);University of Houston(休斯顿大学);HKU AI & Humanity Lab(香港大学AI与人类实验室);Center for Law & AI Risk(法律与人工智能风险中心);Institute for Law & AI(法律与人工智能研究所)

Yonathan Arbel, Peter Salib, Simon Goldstein

AI总结:

本文提出通过‘算法公司’解决AI代理的个体识别与责任归属问题,通过法律虚构实体实现对AI行为的追踪与责任划分。

摘要:

不久的将来,数以百万计的AI代理将在经济中 proliferate,自主执行数十亿次操作。不可避免地,事情会出错。人类将被欺诈、受伤,甚至死亡。法律将不得不在即将到来的浪潮中进行规范。但当AI造成损害时,首先要回答的问题是:哪个AI导致了这一切?识别AI通常非常困难。AI没有身体。它们可以复制、分裂、合并、聚集并消失。即使今天,一个“单一”的AI代理通常是由多个模型实例组成的集合。随着AI能力的提升,这种复杂性只会增加。本文是首次全面诊断识别AI的法律问题。需要两种身份:

英文摘要:

Very soon, millions of AI agents will proliferate across the economy, autonomously taking billions of actions. Inevitably, things will go wrong. Humans will be defrauded, injured, even killed. Law will somehow have to govern the coming wave. But when an AI causes harm, the first question to answer, before anyone can be held accountable is: Which AI Did It? Identifying AIs is unusually difficult. AIs lack bodies. They can copy, split, merge, swarm, and vanish at will. Even today, a "single" AI agent is often an ensemble of instances based on multiple models. The complexity will only multiply as AI capabilities improve. This Article is the first to comprehensively diagnose the legal problem of identifying AIs. Two kinds of identity are required: "thin" and "thick." Thin identification ties every AI action to some human principal, essential for holding accountable the humans who make and use AI agents. Thick identification distinguishes between AI agents, qua agents -- sorting millions of AI entities into discrete, persistent units with stable, coherent goals, essential where principal-agent problems prevent humans from perfectly controlling AIs. This Article also presents a solution: the "Algorithmic Corporation" or "A-corp" -- a legal-fictional entity that can hold property, make contracts, and litigate in its own name. Owned by humans but run by AIs, A-corps solve the thin identity problem by tying AI actions to a human owner, and the thick identity problem via emergent self-organization. A-corps own the resources -- including compute -- that AIs need to accomplish their goals, giving AI managers strong incentives to share control only with goal-aligned AIs. In equilibrium, incentive and selection mechanisms force A-corps to self-organize into persistent, legally legible entities with coherent goals that respond rationally to legal incentives, like liability.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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