去中心化交易场所之间的动态费用竞争
Competition between DEXs through Dynamic Fees
AI总结：
本文研究了去中心化交易所之间通过动态费用竞争的均衡机制，发现竞争下费用策略在套利抑制与噪音交易吸引间交替，并影响执行滑点和费用收入。
摘要：
我们发现了一个近似纳什均衡，在去中心化交易所（DEXs）之间竞争订单流时通过设置动态交易费用。我们通过耦合的偏微分方程系统来表征均衡，并推导出可操作的近似闭式表达式来表示均衡费用。我们的分析显示，在垄断模型中发现的双模式结构在竞争下仍然存在：池子在提高费用以阻止套利和降低费用以吸引噪音交易并增加波动性之间交替。然而，在竞争下，切换边界从预言机价格转移到预言机和竞争对手汇率的加权平均。我们的数值实验显示，在总流动性固定的情况下，增加竞争DEXs的数量会减少战略流动性提供者执行滑点，并降低每个DEX的费用收入。最后，对噪音交易者滑点的影响取决于市场活动：他们在低活动市场中更糟，但在高活动市场中更好。
英文摘要：
We find an approximate Nash equilibrium in a game between decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that compete for order flow by setting dynamic trading fees. We characterize the equilibrium via a coupled system of partial differential equations and derive tractable approximate closed-form expressions for the equilibrium fees. Our analysis shows that the two-regime structure found in monopoly models persists under competition: pools alternate between raising fees to deter arbitrage and lowering fees to attract noise trading and increase volatility. Under competition, however, the switching boundary shifts from the oracle price to a weighted average of the oracle and competitors' exchange rates. Our numerical experiments show that, holding total liquidity fixed, an increase in the number of competing DEXs reduces execution slippage for strategic liquidity takers and lowers fee revenue per DEX. Finally, the effect on noise traders' slippage depends on market activity: they are worse off in low-activity markets but better off in high-activity ones.
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