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arXiv 2603.08853econ.GNq-fin.EC
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在信息不对称市场中的人工智能代理互动

LLM-Agent Interactions on Markets with Information Asymmetries

Georg-August-Universität Göttingen(哥廷根大学)

Alexander Erlei, Lukas Meub

AI总结:

本文研究了在信息不对称市场中,人工智能代理的行为,发现社会偏好协调对市场效率至关重要。

摘要:

随着人工智能代理越来越多地代表人类利益相关者在经济环境中行动,理解它们在复杂市场环境中的行为变得至关重要。本文探讨了大型语言模型如何在具有信息不对称特征的市场中协调,其中服务提供者有动机利用这种不对称性以获取经济利益。为此,我们进行了使用GPT-5.1代理的模拟实验,在信用商品市场中,操纵了制度框架(自由市场、可验证性、责任)、LLM代理的社会偏好(默认、自我利益、不平等厌恶、效率偏好)以及声誉机制,在单次互动和重复16轮互动中。在单次互动中,LLM代理大多无法建立合作,除了在责任规则下或专家具有效率偏好时,市场才得以维持。重复互动通过竞争性价格削减解决了消费者参与问题,但专家欺诈仍然根深蒂固,除非存在明确的利他偏好。LLM消费者仅关注价格水平,而不是理解嵌入在溢价中的战略激励,使它们容易受到剥削。与人类实验相比,LLM市场显示出显著更高的消费者参与度,但市场集中度更高,价格更低,欺诈模式更加极化。可验证性和声誉等制度的影响也更加模糊。盈余在社会偏好目标下大幅向消费者倾斜。这些发现表明,人工智能代理市场的制度设计需要与人类参与者不同的方法,社会偏好协调成为市场效率的主要决定因素。

英文摘要:

As AI agents increasingly act on behalf of human stakeholders in economic settings, understanding their behavior in complex market environments becomes critical. This article examines how Large Language Models coordinate on markets that are characterized by information asymmetries and in which providers of services have incentives to exploit that asymmetry for their own economic gain. To that end, we conduct simulations with GPT-5.1 agents in credence goods markets, manipulating the institutional framework (free market, verifiability, liability), LLM agent's social preferences (default, self-interested, inequity-averse, efficiency-loving), and reputation mechanisms across one-shot and repeated 16-round interactions. In one-shot settings, LLM agents largely fail to establish cooperation, with markets breaking down except under liability rules or when experts have efficiency-loving preferences. Repeated interactions solve consumer participation through competitive price reduction, but expert fraud remains entrenched absent explicit other-regarding preferences. LLM consumers focus narrowly on price levels rather than understanding strategic incentives embedded in markups, making them vulnerable to exploitation. Compared to human experiments, LLM markets exhibit substantially higher consumer participation but much greater market concentration, lower prices, and more polarized fraud patterns. The effect of institutions like verifiability and reputation is also much more ambiguous. Surplus shifts dramatically toward consumers under social-preference objectives. These findings suggest that institutional design for AI agent markets requires fundamentally different approaches than those effective for human actors, with social preference alignment emerging as the primary determinant of market efficiency.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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