可信研究中攻击个人身份信息去除技术的困境
The Conundrum of Trustworthy Research on Attacking Personally Identifiable Information Removal Techniques
AI总结：
研究探讨了个人身份信息去除技术在真实场景中保护隐私的有效性，指出现有攻击评估存在问题，需通过真正私有数据客观评估，但获取此类数据受限影响研究透明度。
摘要：
从文本中去除个人身份信息（PII）是遵守各种数据保护法规和实现数据共享而不泄露隐私的必要步骤。然而，最近的研究表明，经过PII去除技术净化的文档容易受到重建攻击。但我们怀疑这些攻击的成功率被高估了。我们批判性地分析现有攻击的评估，发现数据泄露和数据污染未得到妥善缓解，使得PII去除技术在真实场景中是否真正保护隐私的问题未被解决。我们调查了可能的数据来源和攻击设置，以避免数据泄露，并得出结论：只有真正私有数据才能让我们客观评估PII去除技术的漏洞。然而，访问私有数据受到严格限制——出于良好原因——这也意味着公共研究社区无法以透明、可重复和可信的方式解决这个问题。
英文摘要：
Removing personally identifiable information (PII) from texts is necessary to comply with various data protection regulations and to enable data sharing without compromising privacy. However, recent works show that documents sanitized by PII removal techniques are vulnerable to reconstruction attacks. Yet, we suspect that the reported success of these attacks is largely overestimated. We critically analyze the evaluation of existing attacks and find that data leakage and data contamination are not properly mitigated, leaving the question whether or not PII removal techniques truly protect privacy in real-world scenarios unaddressed. We investigate possible data sources and attack setups that avoid data leakage and conclude that only truly private data can allow us to objectively evaluate vulnerabilities in PII removal techniques. However, access to private data is heavily restricted - and for good reasons - which also means that the public research community cannot address this problem in a transparent, reproducible, and trustworthy manner.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
