通过休眠授权路径实现条件触发的加密资产控制
Condition-Triggered Cryptographic Asset Control via Dormant Authorization Paths
AI总结：
CT-DAP通过休眠授权路径实现条件触发的加密资产控制，利用可破坏授权因素和根可推导框架，在不暴露密钥的情况下实现安全可控的资产转移。
摘要：
加密数字资产的控制传统上被等同于私钥的永久持有，这种模型排除了监管监督、条件委托和在加密层上合法合规的转移。现有解决方案（多重签名方案、阈值签名、智能合约、托管委托）需要持续的密钥暴露、链上状态变更或受信任的中介。我们引入条件触发的休眠授权路径（CT-DAP），一种基于可破坏授权因素的加密资产控制方法，其参数化于一个根可推导的框架，满足确定性密钥推导、上下文隔离的能力生成和授权绑定的撤销。在CT-DAP中，控制权由用户持有的凭证和由独立托管人持有的管理因素组成的休眠授权路径组成；路径在所有因素同时可用之前在密码学上处于非活动状态。在验证预定义条件（例如用户同意、继承事件、时间触发器）后，相应因素被释放，从而激活路径。撤销通过破坏因素实现，使路径永久不可用，而无需改变加密根。我们正式化了威胁模型，定义了针对未经授权控制抵抗、路径隔离和无状态撤销的安全游戏，并在标准假设下证明了安全性（AEAD安全性的AES-GCM-SIV，HKDF的PRF安全，Argon2id的记忆强度，SHA-256的碰撞抵抗）。我们使用原子加密实体生成框架（ACE-GF）实例化CT-DAP，并评估其性能，展示了亚秒级激活延迟，具有可配置的安全性-性能权衡。
英文摘要：
Control of encrypted digital assets is traditionally equated with permanent possession of private keys, a model that precludes regulatory supervision, conditional delegation, and legally compliant transfer at the cryptographic layer. Existing remedies (multi-signature schemes, threshold signatures, smart contracts, custodial delegation) require persistent key exposure, on-chain state mutation, or trusted intermediaries. We introduce Condition-Triggered Dormant Authorization Paths (CT-DAP), a cryptographic asset control method built on destructible authorization factors and parameterized by a root-derivable framework satisfying deterministic key derivation, context-isolated capability generation, and authorization-bound revocation. Under CT-DAP, control rights are dormant authorization paths composed of user-held credentials and administrative factors held by independent custodians; a path remains cryptographically inactive until all factors are simultaneously available. Upon verification of predefined conditions (e.g., user consent, inheritance events, time-based triggers), the corresponding factor is released, activating the path. Revocation is achieved by destroying factors, rendering the path permanently unusable without altering the cryptographic root. We formalize the threat model, define security games for unauthorized control resistance, path isolation, and stateless revocation, and prove security under standard assumptions (AEAD security of AES-GCM-SIV, PRF security of HKDF, memory-hardness of Argon2id, collision resistance of SHA-256). We instantiate CT-DAP using the Atomic Cryptographic Entity Generative Framework (ACE-GF) and evaluate performance, demonstrating sub-second activation latency with configurable security-performance trade-offs.
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