Energy-time attack on detectors in quantum key distribution
Vigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo(维戈大学量子通信中心);atlanTTic Research Center, University of Vigo(维戈大学atlanTTic研究中心);Russian Quantum Center, Skolkovo(俄罗斯量子中心);NTI Center for Quantum Communications, National University of Science and Technology MISiS(国立科技大学MISiS NTI量子通信中心);Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology(莫斯科物理技术学院);Moscow Technical University of Communications and Informatics(莫斯科通信与信息技术工业大学);QRate, Skolkovo(QRate)
Konstantin Zaitsev, Vladimir Bizin, Dmitriy Kuzmin, Vadim Makarov
备注:
Minor improvements after referee comments. 11 pages, 6 figures
Quantum key distribution is unbreakable in theory but may be hacked via imperfections in its hardware implementations. While many imperfections have been mitigated by countermeasures and advanced security proofs, several remain unsolved. One of these is a superlinear behaviour in single-photon detectors, when the click probability rises faster with the photon number of an incoming light pulse than expected from individual independent photon detections. Here we test an avalanche single-photon detector sinusoidally-gated at 312.5 MHz for superlinearity. Its click probability is moderately superlinear. However, we notice that the click timing depends strongly on the incoming pulse energy. The click occurs progressively earlier, shifting more than 2 ns as the energy rises over a wide 50-dB range. An attacker might use this energy-time effect to conditionally toggle the click between adjacent key bit slots, violating an implicit assumption in the security proofs and rendering them inapplicable. We propose two attacks that exploit this flaw.
Comment on "Inherent security of phase coding quantum key distribution systems against detector blinding attacks" [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]
A simple proof that Gaussian attacks are optimal among collective attacks against continuous-variable quantum key distribution with a Gaussian modulation