arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2603.03398cs.CRcs.AI
收藏

基于格的混合加密的零知识联邦学习用于量子安全的医疗AI

Zero-Knowledge Federated Learning with Lattice-Based Hybrid Encryption for Quantum-Resilient Medical AI

Department of Emergency Medicine & STaR-AI Research Group(急诊医学系及STaR-AI研究组)

Edouard Lansiaux

AI总结:

ZKFL-PQ通过抗量子加密和零知识证明,实现医疗AI模型在量子安全下的隐私保护与鲁棒性。

摘要:

联邦学习(FL)能够在不集中患者数据的情况下,使医院之间协同训练医疗AI模型。然而,模型更新的交换暴露了关键漏洞:梯度倒置攻击可以重建患者信息,拜占庭客户端可以污染全局模型,而'现在收获,后来解密'(HNDL)威胁使当今加密流量对未来的量子对手脆弱。我们引入ZKFL-PQ(零知识联邦学习,后量子),一种三层加密协议,结合(i)ML-KEM(FIPS 203)用于抗量子密钥封装,(ii)基于格的零知识证明用于可验证的范数约束梯度完整性,以及(iii)BFV同态加密用于隐私保护的聚合。我们正式化了安全模型,并在模块LWE、环LWE和SIS假设下证明了正确性和零知识属性,这在经典随机预言模型中成立。我们在合成医疗影像数据上评估了ZKFL-PQ,跨5个联邦客户端进行10轮训练。我们的协议在拒绝所有范数违规更新的同时,保持模型准确率为100%,相比之下,标准FL会导致准确率骤降至23%。计算开销(因子约为20倍)进行了分析,并显示其与每日或每周训练周期的临床研究工作流程兼容。我们强调,当前的防御措施仅能拒绝大规模范数恶意更新;对细微低范数或方向性污染的鲁棒性仍需未来工作。

英文摘要:

Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative training of medical AI models across hospitals without centralizing patient data. However, the exchange of model updates exposes critical vulnerabilities: gradient inversion attacks can reconstruct patient information, Byzantine clients can poison the global model, and the \emph{Harvest Now, Decrypt Later} (HNDL) threat renders today's encrypted traffic vulnerable to future quantum adversaries.We introduce \textbf{ZKFL-PQ} (\emph{Zero-Knowledge Federated Learning, Post-Quantum}), a three-tiered cryptographic protocol that hybridizes (i) ML-KEM (FIPS~203) for quantum-resistant key encapsulation, (ii) lattice-based Zero-Knowledge Proofs for verifiable \emph{norm-constrained} gradient integrity, and (iii) BFV homomorphic encryption for privacy-preserving aggregation. We formalize the security model and prove correctness and zero-knowledge properties under the Module-LWE, Ring-LWE, and SIS assumptions \emph{in the classical random oracle model}. We evaluate ZKFL-PQ on synthetic medical imaging data across 5 federated clients over 10 training rounds. Our protocol achieves \textbf{100\% rejection of norm-violating updates} while maintaining model accuracy at 100\%, compared to a catastrophic drop to 23\% under standard FL. The computational overhead (factor $\sim$20$\times$) is analyzed and shown to be compatible with clinical research workflows operating on daily or weekly training cycles. We emphasize that the current defense guarantees rejection of large-norm malicious updates; robustness against subtle low-norm or directional poisoning remains future work.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑