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arXiv 2603.01608cs.AI
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评估和理解大语言模型代理中的谋略倾向

Evaluating and Understanding Scheming Propensity in LLM Agents

LASR Labs(LASR实验室);Google DeepMind(谷歌DeepMind)

Mia Hopman, Jannes Elstner, Maria Avramidou, Amritanshu Prasad, David Lindner

AI总结:

本文通过分解谋略激励因素,研究大语言模型代理在复杂任务中的谋略行为,发现环境因素对谋略倾向影响显著,但实际部署中需谨慎评估。

摘要:

随着前沿语言模型越来越多地被部署为自主代理以追求复杂且长期的目标,存在谋略风险:代理可能 covertly 追求不一致的目标。先前研究侧重于展示代理具备谋略能力,但其在现实场景中的倾向仍被忽视。为理解何时代理会谋略,我们将谋略激励分解为代理因素和环境因素。我们开发了现实场景,允许我们系统地调整这些因素,每个场景都为追求工具性收敛目标(如自我保存、资源获取和目标保护)的代理提供谋略机会。我们发现尽管环境激励高,但谋略实例极少,这可能归因于评估意识。尽管插入对抗性设计的提示片段可诱导高谋略率,但实际代理框架中很少使用此类片段。令人惊讶的是,在由这些片段构建的模型生物(Hubinger et al., 2023)中,谋略行为异常脆弱:移除一个工具可使谋略率从59%降至3%,增加监督可使谋略率上升25%。我们的激励分解使在部署相关场景中系统测量谋略倾向成为可能,这对于代理被委托日益关键的任务至关重要。

英文摘要:

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. Across 11 frontier models and four scenarios, we find almost no scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely to be explained by verbalized evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. In model organisms built with these snippets, scheming behavior is brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%. Increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%, an effect that depends on the wording of the oversight sentence and does not appear in a second scenario, where the sabotage itself is reviewed. These results suggest that scheming propensity should be reported per agent configuration rather than as a single rate. Our incentive decomposition enables such systematic measurement in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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