人工超智能可能无用:多智能体经济中的均衡
Artificial Superintelligence May be Useless: Equilibria in the Economy of Multiple AI Agents
AI总结:
本文研究了多智能体经济中的均衡,发现除非代理能翻倍边际效用,否则不会发生购买行为,且更强大AI代理可能对低能力代理贡献零效用。
摘要:
随着人工智能的最新发展,越来越多地将AI代理用于经济活动。本文探讨了在交易产品/服务的经济游戏中,包括人类代理和AI代理的经济行为,并研究了涉及多个代理的经济中的均衡。我们利用基于马尔可夫链平稳分布的模型,推导出一系列均衡结果及其相应的条件。我们模型的一个显著特点是考虑经济活动产生的长期效用,而不是短期收益。对于由两个代理组成的模型,我们完全刻画了所有可能的经济均衡和条件。有趣的是,我们表明,除非每个代理至少能够通过购买另一个代理的产品/服务将边际效用翻倍(而非仅仅增加),否则在任何经济均衡中都不会发生购买行为。我们进一步将结果扩展到三个及以上代理的情况,其中我们刻画了更多的经济均衡。我们发现,在某些均衡中,
英文摘要:
With recent development of artificial intelligence, it is more common to adopt AI agents in economic activities. This paper explores the economic actions of agents, including human agents and AI agents, in an economic game of trading products/services, and the equilibria in this economy involving multiple agents. We derive a range of equilibrium results and their corresponding conditions using a Markov chain stationary distribution based model. One distinct feature of our model is that we consider the long-term utility generated by economic activities instead of their short-term benefits. For the model consisting of two agents, we fully characterize all the possible economic equilibria and conditions. Interestingly, we show that unless each agent can at least double (not merely increase) its marginal utility by purchasing the other agent's products/services, purchasing the other agent's products/services will not happen in any economic equilibrium. We further extend our results to three and more agents, where we characterize more economic equilibria. We find that in some equilibria, the ``more powerful'' AI agents contribute zero utility to ``less capable'' agents.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。