基于时间步长的电网中DoS、DoD和FDI攻击的时序物理仿真
Time Stepped Cyber Physical Simulation of DoS, DoD, and FDI Attacks on the IEEE 14 Bus System
AI总结：
本文基于MATPOWER构建时间步长仿真框架，评估DoS、DoD和FDI攻击对IEEE 14节点系统的影响，揭示不同攻击对电网运行的破坏作用及网络攻击引发的不稳定性问题。
摘要：
可靠的电网运行依赖于准确及时的遥测数据，使现代电力系统容易受到通信层网络攻击。本文评估了针对IEEE 14节点系统的DoS、DoD和FDI攻击如何通过基于MATPOWER的MATLAB仅用时间步长仿真框架来破坏系统。该框架模拟了24小时运行周期，包含正弦负载变化，引入了针对攻击的负载和电压数据操控，并执行完整的交流功率流计算，包括无功限制执行（PV PQ切换）。在每个时间步长中，系统记录真实和测量的电压、发电机P/Q输出、系统损耗和电压限制违规情况，以捕捉瞬时网络物理效应。结果表明，DoD导致最大的物理扭曲和无功功率压力，DoS掩盖了自然变化并降低了态势感知能力，FDI则在真实和感知电压之间造成了显著差异。本研究提供了一个紧凑、可重复的基准，用于分析网络诱导的不稳定性，并为未来的防御策略提供信息。
英文摘要：
Reliable grid operation depends on accurate and timely telemetry, making modern power systems vulnerable to communication layer cyberattacks. This paper evaluates how Denial of Service (DoS), Denial of Data (DoD), and False Data Injection (FDI) attacks disrupt the IEEE 14 bus system using a MATLAB only, time stepped simulation framework built on MATPOWER. The framework emulates a 24 hour operating cycle with sinusoidal load variation, introduces attack specific manipulation of load and voltage data, and performs full AC power flow solves with reactive limit enforcement (PV PQ switching). At each timestep, the system logs true and measured voltages, generator P/Q output, system losses, and voltage limit violations to capture transient cyber physical effects. Results show that DoD causes the largest physical distortions and reactive power stress, DoS masks natural variability and degrades situational awareness, and FDI creates significant discrepancies between true and perceived voltages. The study provides a compact, reproducible benchmark for analyzing cyber induced instability and informing future defense strategies.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
